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Zambia is now one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  It is a land-abundant but 
sparsely populated country of 11 million inhabitants. This paper attempts to explain why the 
Zambian state has remained resilient over the period 1960-2010 despite confronting a 
substantial set of crises and unfavourable ‘initial conditions’, which include: one of the worst 
declines in per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa since 1970, a heavy debt burden, 
dramatic price and production declines in its main export (copper), one of the continent’s 
most unequal distributions of income, one of the worst HIV/AIDS epidemics in the world, 
declines in its Human Development Index in every decade since 1980, relatively high levels 
of poverty, substantial influxes of refugees (particularly in the 1990s) that reached as high as 
200,000, high transport costs as a result of being a landlocked economy,  and  being 
surrounded by five countries that have experienced civil wars and political disorder.  
 
By any conceivable measure, the growth performance of Zambia has been poor (see Table 1). 
Zambia’s long-run trajectory of economic decline is closely related to the dramatic decline in 
its main industry, copper. In 1969, Zambia was the largest producer of copper among 
developing countries, and the third largest producer after the United States and the former 
USSR, with production twelve percent of world production.  By 1990, Zambia produced only 
five percent of world production, compared to Chile and the United States each with eighteen 
percent; Canada eight percent, and the then-U.S.S.R. seven. Over the long term, exports 
declined from 622,900 metric tonnes in 1972 to 228,000 on the eve of privatisation in 1999. 
The decline in copper had reversed a dramatic five-fold increase in copper production in the 
period 1939-1960 under the colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia. At this time, 
copper production was under the control of the British Mining Company. 
 
Table 1: Zambia’s Per Capita Growth Rates in Comparative Perspective 1961-1990 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
 
Country 1961-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-2000 
Zambia .7 .8 .5 -4.0 -2.2 -.8 -2.7 -.2 
Sub-Sahara 
African 
Average 2.2 1.5 3.3 .9 -.5 .5 -1.4 2.0 
Zambia’s 
rank: 16/26 20/31 22/32 30/32 29/36 26/40 32/41 34/41 
 
The reasons for the decline in Zambian economic performance are complex, but include a 
combination of the disruption of regional trading routes, the nationalisation of the copper 
industry before the development of skilled workers and managers emerged on the domestic 
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scene, and mismanagement of the state-owned copper industry (see Weeks et al. 2004 and 
Appendix).  
 
Historical events were to prove disastrous to the exporting prospects of the economy at 
independence. First, Zambia found itself in the position of a ‘front-line state‘ – against white-
ruled Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa (Burnell 2005). The declaration of 
independence by Rhodesia and its blockade of Zambian trade caused Zambia to lose its two 
transport links for exporting its copper, through Rhodesia and South Africa.  This resulted in a 
dramatic increase in transport costs, such that despite productivity raising innovations in 
copper mining and concentrating, Zambia was rendered a high-cost producer on the world 
market. In 1976, construction was completed of a rail link to Dar es Salaam, but for ten years 
the Zambia economy suffered from the politically-motivated disruption of its export products.  
The slow growth of the economy during 1965-1976 can to a great extent be explained by this 
disruption. Second, the rapid exodus of skilled white settler mining workers created a skilled 
shortage in labour. By necessity this replacement of labour occurred rapidly, before sufficient 
skills had been developed. Third, the inward-looking bias of industry and the drive to achieve 
self-sufficiency in many sectors proved to be dysfunctional but were partly driven by conflicts 
in neighbouring countries. 
 
Figure 1: Ethnic, linguistic and provincial cleavages in Zambia (%) 
Source: Lindeman 2009. 
 
Apart from poor economic performance, one of the main challenges of post-independence 
rule in Zambia has been to manage the potential dangers of a country that has potentially 
explosive ethnic and regional cleavages. The territory that would become known through 
colonial rule as, first, Northern Rhodesia and then at independence Zambia contains about 72 
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different ethnic groupings (see Figure 1).1 The largest ones include the Bemba (18.1 percent), 
Tonga (12.7 percent), Chewa (7.2 percent), Lozi (5.6 percent), Nsenga (5.5 percent), 
Tumbuka (4.2 percent), Ngoni (4 percent), Lala (3.3 percent), Kaonde (3 percent), Namwanga 
(2.7 percent), Lunda (2.5 percent), Ushi (2.4 percent), Mambwe (2.3 percent), Lamba (2.2 
percent) and Luvale (2.1 percent). In colonial times, as tribes were transformed into units of 
territorially based administration, loyalties to pre-colonial identities were preserved or even 
reinforced. The result of this process was that national conflicts were increasingly seen in 
linguistic terms, while local interactions continued to be framed in ethnic terms. The picture 
was further complicated by the fact that the different communal identities were clustered into 
eight (later nine) administrative provinces (Figure 1).  
 
Despite these conditions, an important puzzle to explain is why, against the odds, the 
Zambian polity has been able to maintain political order and avoid large-scale political 
violence.  Inherent in this puzzle is a larger lesson about state capacities, which are clearly not 
monolithic in Zambia. The ability to maintain political order has coincided with a state 
incapable of promoting sustained economic development. Understanding why a trade-off 
emerged and consolidated between economic growth and political stability is another main 
aim of this paper. 
 
Most accounts explain resilience as the result of careful ethnic and tribal balancing, that is the 
distribution of patronage in the form of an elite bargain (e.g. Burnell, 2005). However, the 
literature does not adequately explain how and why this elite bargain survived the transition 
in the early 1990s from a one-party state with a dominant party (UNIP) to a more competitive 
multi-party electoral system. I argue that the role of a pivotal interest group, namely national 
labour unions, were central to providing an institutional focal point for the emerging 
dominant party, MMD, to form and consolidate. 
 
The second contribution of the paper is to highlight what the Zambian case tells us about 
indicators of state performance. Recent work has tried to ‘measure’ seven key areas of ‘good 
governance’: security of property rights, voice and accountability, political instability and 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption (see 
Kaufman et al. 2005) and identify their contribution to economic performance. The usefulness 
of these types of measurements and explanation is limited in at least two ways.  First, they 
provide only indirect measures of capacity, often based on subjective surveys.  Second, the 
results are aggregate measures, that is, they do not provide any information on the extent to 
which capacity varies across different state functions or sectors within a polity. Inherent in 
Zambia’s history  is a larger lesson about state capacities which are clearly not monolithic.. 
The ability to maintain political order has coincided with a state incapable of promoting 
sustained economic development. Understanding why a trade-off emerged and consolidated 
between economic growth and political stability is another main aim of this paper. 
 
The main arguments of the paper are as follows. First, the absence of large-scale political 
violence in Zambia is argued to be the result of a resilient central state. State resilience, as 
developed in the Crisis States Programme can be understood in terms of security and taxation 
– the two core functions of the state that are indications of its ability to survive through 
                                                 
1 There is no consensus on the origin of the name ‘Zambia’. One possibility is that is comes from the Zambezi 
River. Another potential explanation is that early Portuguese traders referred to the area as ‘Zambezia’, which 
was considered to be an awkward name by Zambian intellectuals and independence movement leaders in the 
1940s and 1950s. It is thought that these leaders coined the term ‘Zambia’  since it was considered easier to 
pronounce and understand than ‘Zambezia’ 
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various crises.  A ‘resilient state’ is one that maintains its command of coercive power and its 
power to undertake basic taxation. This implies first that the state intervenes in ways that 
prevents the likelihood of armed challenge and/or the ability of the state’s armed forces to 
withstand any major, at least internally generated, armed political challenge within its 
territory. Secondly, it implies that the organisational and coercive capacity of the state has 
been maintained strong enough that it has been able to tax goods moving across its borders as 
well as the ability to capture tax from the main economic activities of the country (in this case 
appropriating tax revenues from copper). Both these core state capacities have a territorial and 
political dimension to them; understanding these involves an assessment of the territorial and 
political reach of the state. 
 
The second main argument is that state resilience in Zambia has been the result of relatively 
stable and inclusive bargain among contending elites, which reduced the possibility of 
substantial capital accumulation and political power outside of the formal political system. 
This elite bargain lessened the incentives of powerful actors to challenge state actors, and also 
provided the mechanisms through which challenges to state authority (which did occur in 
1991) were negotiated in a way that did not lead to political violence. This, it is argued, was 
achieved through the ability of post-independent political leaders to construct a centralised 
form of patrimonial patronage that provided a powerful executive the ability to view the 
distribution of state resources and the valuable assets in an encompassing way. While there 
has been substantial faction fighting within Zambia, the maintenance of a centralised form of 
patronage prevented such faction fighting from developing into alternative sources of 
authority and power in the polity, which have proved de-stabilising to political order in more 
fragmented patrimonial regimes (see Allen 1995 and 1999) Finally, it is argued that the 
construction and maintenance of a dominant national political party, along with the weakness 
of autonomous interest groups, was the organisational construct that enabled both an elite 
bargain and centralised forms of patronage to both emerge and consolidate, despite changes in 
electoral competition and the transformation of the economy from a heavily interventionist 
model to a more liberal model in the 1990s 
 
The Zambian case can shed some light on the political and economic strategies that ultimately 
proved effective in conflict prevention.  Political agency has been central to overcoming the 
difficult ‘attributes’/structural factors that made Zambia vulnerable to violent conflict that 
were highlighted above.  This case also highlights that particular economic and political 
strategies have proved successful in preventing conflict in the face of potentially de-
stabilising ‘moments’ such multi-party competition based on ethnic and regional identity in 
the 1960s, drastic declines in its main export industry, copper from the mid-1970s to the late 
1990s, a heavy debt burden in the 1980s and 1990s, and the introduction of multi-party 
electoral competition in 1991 after over 25 years of one-party rule. 
 
Patterns of patronage and state resilience in sub-Saharan Africa 
In the political science literature there is a tendency to model ‘African polities’ monolithically 
as dysfunctional states where corruption, clientelism, and patrimonial rule predominate.  
Examples would include single characterisations of African politics as ‘personal rule’ 
(Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Sandbrook 1985), as the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1989), as 
the ‘politics of chaos’ (Kaplan 1994), or as ‘disorder as political instrument’ (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999).  The idea in this literature is not to posit that political order is maintained 
through liberal notions of good governance, but to understand how and why processes of 
corruption and clientelism have differential outcomes.  Given the limited availability of 
resources, the limited tax base and the political contestation over valuable but scarce 
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resources, corruption and clientelism are features of all less developed countries (Khan 2005; 
North et. al 2007). Moreover, as Allen (1995) points out, a more careful reading of African 
political history reveals a much greater variation and change in the nature of African polities.  
 
Faced with often rapid de-colonisation and intense ethnic, regional, and class contestation, 
African leaders sought to achieve political order and electoral competitiveness through the 
construction of patron-client links in two ways: either a) a reliance on individuals who have 
considerable local following; or b) the use of patronage politics to bind local notables to 
emerging parties and local voters to the candidates supported by such parties (Allen 1995: 
304).  These initial post-colonial strategies bred significant factionalism within political 
movements and led to crises in governments across the continent by the late 1960s.  The 
resolution of these crises in governability and political order led to two different types of 
responses in terms of political re-organisation. Both involved the retention of clientlelist and 
patrimonial practices.  
 
However, Allen argues that patrimonialism in the African context transformed into two broad 
categories: firstly, centralised bureaucratic patrimonial systems (such as Tanzania, Zambia); 
and secondly, more fragmented, ‘spoils systems’ (Zaire/DRC, Nigeria).  The former involved 
the centralisation of power in the executive (where the dominant institution in the one-party 
state was the presidency with strong supporting party links).  The latter involves a more 
personalist and narrow presidentialist rule without extensive political party support and the 
implementation of ‘divide and conquer’ strategies to more selectively accommodate ethnic 
and regional interests.  The latter strategies resulted in a more ‘winner takes all’ (or 
indivisible) distribution of resources.  Thus, a basic difference between these two types of rule 
is that the former was more institutionalised and inclusive in distributing patronage than the 
latter, which was based on more personal and more selective (or exclusive) distribution 
patterns.  Furthermore, Allen argues that the former are more likely to be more stable and less 
violent.  Thus, this paper attempts to develop a framework in order to understand the politics 
underlying the ability of the Zambian political leaders to centralise and bureaucratise power in 
the executive. 
 
There is a wide range of theoretical work in economic and political science − beginning with 
the works of Hobbes and Machiavelli − that supports the view that a relatively powerful 
central patron is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the construction of developmental 
outcomes.  In more recent times, in the economics literature, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
argue that the degree of centralisation of state institutions has important effects on the extent 
to which corrupt transactions affect economic growth.  In this model, bribery has a much less 
negative affect on development when state institutions are centralised as opposed to 
fragmented.  This is because a more centralised state structure allows the executive to 
coordinate the bribe take and thus limit the size of bribes so as to choke off economic activity. 
In more fragmented states, where multiple agencies take bribes independently, a ‘prisoners 
dilemma’ problem emerges since each agency takes the quantity of state favours/licenses 
supplied by other agencies as given, while attempting to maximise its own bribe collection.  
As a result, the bribe level for each individual state agency is set at such a high level that the 
demand for licenses and state regulation declines, which reduces economic activity. 
 
The Sheifer and Vishny model can help explain why centralised state agencies as in South 
Korea had less damaging forms of corruption than say in more fragmented states in South 
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Asia or in some sub-Saharan African countries such as the Zaire/DRC or Nigeria.2  Another 
beneficial effect of centralised corruption/patronage (not discussed by Sheifer and Vishny) is 
that the predictability of contracts may be higher than in more fragmented state systems.  This 
is because the enforcement of contracts is likely to be higher in centralised system versus 
more fragmented ones. 
 
Olson’s (1993) ‘bandit theory’ offers a similar insight into the advantages of centralised rule.  
In this model, a leader that has a long time horizon, what he calls a ‘stationary bandit’, has the 
incentive to maximise the rate of economic growth as this will maximise the resources 
accruing to the state in the long-run.  In short, stationary bandits have an ‘encompassing’ 
interest in promoting economic development.  This contrasts with a situation of ‘roving 
banditry’ where there are either competing regional warlords or where the executive hold on 
power is fragile.  In this case, leaders have a short-run time horizon and they pillage the 
economy as fast as they can which has obvious negative effects on economic activity.  Once 
again, this model can help explain why successful economic development has occurred under 
some types of authoritarian rule. 
 
The weakness of both models is they do not explain why some centralised states have 
produced horrific negative outcomes such as genocide (Nazi Germany), and politicide (Pol 
Pot’s Cambodia, Stalin’s Soviet Union).  Nor do they tell us why centralised rule under one-
party states such as in Tanzania and Zambia (as we shall see) have generated dysfunctional 
economic policies for long periods of time.  Without incorporating ideology and the political 
support base of centralised rule, it is impossible to assess the motivations of leaders.  One 
factor that seems central to understanding the behaviour of rulers is the extent to which 
predatory actions are effectively deterred by members within the ruling coalition, a point I 
return to below.3  
 
Why would the extent to which centralised patronage (and even corruption) contribute to state 
resilience, which is important to consider as an achievement in a continent ravaged by civil 
wars and subject to severe economic decline.  Moreover, the ability of the state to function 
and not collapse, when experiencing poor economic performance (Tanzania, Zambia in the 
1970s and 1980s) or even when faced with violent political challenge (such as in 
Mozambique and Colombia) may be central to understanding the prospects of post-war and/or 
post-depression economic reconstruction.  A key challenge of this paper is to establish criteria 
for determining the degree of centralisation in Zambia since 1970. 
 
                                                 
2 See Khan 2000 for a critique of the Shleifer and Vishny model, and in particular the inappropriateness of 
viewing the bribe game as a one-shot or static process. 
3 Equally important, these models do not explain why some authoritarian regimes are substantially more pro-
poor, or socially inclusive in terms of policy than others.  For instance, most cases of major land reform in the 
twentieth century have taken place in a handful of non-democratic regimes (South Korea, Taiwan, Cuba, Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union and China).  The role of land reform and of promoting a more equal distribution of 
income has been considered by many to be essential to contributing to political legitimacy and stability and 
hence the rise of developmental states in Scandinavia (Bloomström and Mellor 1991) and East Asian economies 
(Putzel 1992; Kohli 1999). This raises two important points: first is that, contrary to the proponents of good 
governance, there is little evidence that competitive democratic elections produce large-scale pro-poor 
institutional changes; and second, without incorporating the ideological motivations of leaders and examining 
the way legitimacy is constructed, it is difficult to assess the policy stance of a ‘stationary bandit’/authoritarian 
regime.  State resilience (whether under democratic or authoritarian rule) is surely dependent on the extent to 
which the state can command authority, which is, in turn, dependent on the extent to which the state is at least 
passively perceived to be legitimate.  
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It is also important to establish how and why centralised rule and patronage is maintained and 
how it matters for maintaining political order.  North et al. (2007) provide some important 
clues.  They argue that models of state building make two assumptions that lead to 
misunderstanding with respect to how and why polities form: the first is that the state is 
modelled as a single actor; and the second is that the state has a monopoly on violence.  Well 
known examples include Olson’s (1993) stationary bandit model, and North (1981) and 
Levi’s (1988) revenue-maximising monarch, as well as standard theories of rent seeking 
(Buchanan et al. 1980).  Following the insights of Thomas Hobbes, they argue that a more 
realistic place to begin is to assume that violence potential is prevalent throughout society 
rather than being concentrated.  That is, it makes sense to explain rather than assume that the 
state has a monopoly on violence.  The establishment of political order and peace in the 
model requires the creation of incentives for groups to compete for resources through non-
violent mechanisms. 
 
The principal solution through history to the classic Hobbesian problem of endemic violence 
is the creation of what they call ‘limited access orders’ (as opposed to the much rarer, open 
access orders that characterise advanced market economies).  The limited access order creates 
limits on the access to valuable political and economic functions as a way to generate rents.  
The dominant coalition creates opportunities and order by limiting the access to valuable 
resources (land, labour and capital) or access and control of valuable activities – such as 
contract enforcement, property rights enforcement, trade, worship and education – to elite 
groups.  When powerful individuals and groups become privileged insiders and thus possess 
rents relative to those individuals and groups excluded (and since violence threatens or 
reduces those rents), the existence of rents makes it in the interest of the ‘privileged insiders’ 
to cooperate with the coalition in power rather than to fight.  In effect, limited access orders 
create a credible commitment among elites that they will not fight each other.  Of course, the 
maintenance of rents depends on the stability of the coalition in power.  Thus, in limited 
access orders, the political system constructs the economy to create rents as a means of 
solving the Hobbesian problem of endemic violence and political disorder. 
 
The Zambian narrative developed below will show how and why the construction of political 
organisations, particularly dominant political parties, has been central to providing the 
institutional mechanisms of distributing patronage to regional elites and to important political 
constituencies in ways that either prevent challenges to authority and/or maintain cohesion of 
the ruling coalition.  Further evidence of the importance of political party organisation and 
centralised patronage in the maintaining state resiliency can be seen in the cases of South 
Africa, Tanzania, Botswana and Mauritius.  These countries all have strong centralised 
national parties.  Uganda under Museveni would be another example of the construction of 
centralised patronage backed by a strong political organisation.  Beyond the African context, 
there is a substantial literature on the role that political party pacts have played in maintaining 
peaceful transitions to democracy in less developed countries (Burton and Higley 1998). 
Moreover, this line of inquiry will help establish why ‘horizontal inequalities’ become more 
politically salient in some contexts as opposed to others. 
 
It is important to point out that the presence of strong national parties does not necessarily 
translate into competitive party politics.  Many of these countries can be characterised by one-
party rule, as the Zambian case will illustrate.  This challenges many notions of good 
governance that posit that state reconstruction needs to be based on competitive electoral 
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politics.4 What seems to matter for the construction of resilient states is the institutionalisation 
of centralised rule.  Political parties provide a potential focal point from which to organise the 
inclusion of contesting groups, and do so in a way that does not unleash the activation of 
(ethnic, religious, linguistic) boundaries that competitive multi-party politics can in the 
context of scarce resources and an underdeveloped interest group structure (Snyder 2000). 
 
A third task would be to explain why centralised patronage and rule contributes to state 
resilience.  This requires the development of some basic propositions.  Drawing on the 
insights of Olson, Allen and Shleifer and Vishny, the following propositions are put forward 
as an organising framework for understanding state resilience in Zambia: 
 
a. Centralised patronage and rule enables the executive to have an encompassing interest 
in the maintenance of political stability.  As such, most ethnic and regional elite 
interests will likely be accommodated in the distribution of limited patronage.  It is 
also likely that the development of cross-ethnic coalitions will prevent the 
development of horizontal inequalities that can contribute to political violence. 
b. Centralised rule and patronage based on the support of well developed national 
political organisation will limit the extent to which the executive engages in predatory 
and even violent actions.  The emergence of centralised rule based on political 
organisation building means that the legitimate rule is based on rewarding the most 
powerful elites and factions (North et. al. 2007).  This patronage may take many forms 
including the sanctioning of land rights, rights to valuable resources, state 
employment, cheap credit, import licenses, export subsidies and so on.  Thus, the 
development of national political organisations creates the incentives for leaders to 
create durable coalitions and to credibly commit to protecting the privileged 
rights/entitlements of powerful elites.  Moreover, the development of a national party 
is unlikely without the construction of a diverse ethnic and regional coalition of elites 
(regional patrons) and their clients.  This is likely to prevent horizontal inequalities 
between ethnic and regional elites but does not of course address social and class 
within regions and ethnic groups.  The point here is that the construction of capitalism 
through primitive accumulation is unjust, brutal and conflictive; but we need to 
explain why such processes generate state resilience in some contexts and not others. 
In sum, a key variable in preventing predatory/violent rule is the existence of coalition 
members who provide a deterrent to the ruler withdrawing the support of the property 
rights/entitlements.  At the same time, the inclusion of powerful elites in the division 
of state patronage deters such elites from challenging state rule through violent or 
other means.  What would also needs  to be addressed (though not developed in this 
paper given its exclusive focus on Zambia) is why some patronage and entitlement 
structures, which may generate political orders, also generate rapid economic growth 
and development in some contexts and not others. 
c. Centralised patronage and rule with well developed political organisations is more 
likely to create a loyal and unified military.  This follows from the second proposition.  
If most of the powerful elites receive their share of economic rents within the ruling 
party structure, they are less likely to mobilise and promise future rewards to factions 
of the military to rebel. Fragmented patronage systems or cases where the rulers 
survive on ‘divide and conquer’ tactics are more likely to activate ethnic and regional 
boundaries, which will more likely generate greater grievances.  This creates 
                                                 
4 See Snyder (2000) and Paris (2004) for a discussion on how competitive elections can generate political 
instability in the context of underdevelopment. 
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incentives for excluded elites to rebel, which weakens the effective security of the 
entitlements of the few privileged asset owners in the polity.  Fragmented systems are 
also more likely to have a more fluid turnover of ministerial posts (which is a proxy 
for access to privileges) and more military challenges to state authority.  It is well 
known, for example, that in Zaire, Mobutu created multiple parallel military and para-
military organisations to ward off challenges to his rule.  This proposition will be 
addressed briefly in the course of the analytical narrative. 
d. Centralised patronage and rule with well developed political organisations does not 
prevent faction-fighting within the ruling coalition but creates the institutional context 
in which bargains can be made and limits the possibility large-scale challenges to state 
authority will occur.  If a given faction or elite becomes dissatisfied with their share of 
state resources, it is costly for such a faction to rebel.  There are several reasons for 
this: first, it is difficult to mount a violent challenge in the face of a unified military; 
second, as long as the coalition remains largely intact, state support for the regime is 
unlikely to wane in the face of a few defectors; and third, the economic cost of exiting 
the coalition is high since the ruling coalition in centralised systems controls access to 
most of the valuable assets. In sum, the net benefits of exiting (‘the only game in 
town’) are costly in economic and political terms. As stated in proposition 3, the 
motivations and potential net benefits of challenging the state are likely to be much 
higher in fragmented patronage systems where ‘divide and conquer’ strategies reign, 
the security of entitlements are weaker and the contestation over rights is likely to be 
more violent. 
e. Finally, centralised patronage and rule is more likely to manage adverse economic 
shocks and crises in ways that do not generate state breakdown.  There are several 
reasons for this.  Because the ruling coalition represents a more ‘encompassing’ 
interest than in fragmented/spoils-systems patronage, there is both the collective 
action capacity and incentive for leaders of a ruling coalition to reduce the downturn 
in patronage resources in a relatively egalitarian way.  In the fragmented patronage 
system, no such institutional mechanism exists to distribute the downturn in 
patronage.  The reduction in patronage resources makes ‘divide and conquer’ 
strategies more difficult since there are fewer resources to play off competing factions.  
Moreover, given the fragmented nature of militaries in such systems, downturns in 
economic fortunes are likely to create incentives for factions of the military to act 
opportunistically and foment rebellion.  The mechanisms posited here may explain 
why negative commodity shocks in the DRC (a fragmented/spoils system) led to 
large-scale civil war and state breakdown, while a similar commodity shock in Zambia 
(which we shall see approximates a centralised patronage system with a dominant 
political party) has not led either to state breakdown or large-scale political violence.   
The rest of the paper attempts to address each one of these propositions in light of the political 
and economic history of Zambia. Moreover, this framework will enable us to consider the 
extent to which that history has neglected and/or inadequately explained state resilience in 
Zambia. Before examining the political construction centralised patterns of patronage, we turn 
to the political economy underlying the protracted and profound economic decline in post-
independence Zambia, which only underscores the non-trivial achievement of political order 
in the face of the dramatic decline in the resources available for political leaders to distribute 
in the form of patronage. 
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The elements of state resilience in Zambia 
If long-run episodes of economic decline and poverty are among the main causes of state 
collapse and widespread political violence (Collier et al. 2003), then it is important to 
understand how the Zambian state has remained resilient despite confronting among the worst 
declines in economic growth and increases in poverty over the past forty years. Indeed, there 
are few examples of resilient states that have experienced the levels of economic decline that 
Zambia has experienced.  While Zambia’s state resilience is hardly unique in Africa, only 
Malawi, Tanzania and Botswana share a comparatively tranquil record, and all of them, 
particularly the latter, have a more impressive economic performance record in the past forty 
years (Burnell 2005). A second important reason to explain state resilience in Zambia is that it 
is surrounded by five countries that have experienced protracted civil wars. The literature on 
regional war complexes (Wallenstein and Sollenberg 1998) argues that being in a ‘bad 
neighbourhood‘ increases the risk of violent domestic conflict. 
 
There are two important senses in which the Zambian state has been resilient. The first is that 
there has been a lack of large-scale political violence in the postcolonial period (Burnell 
2005).  This is not to say that there has been no repression, no coup attempts, no labour unrest 
or some political violence, but these have been relatively mild, compared with its neighbours. 
The second sense in which the state has been resilient is its ability to maintain relatively 
robust levels of tax collection. More research is needed on tax collection in Zambia in the 
1970s and 1980s. However, more recent evidence suggests that Zambia is a relatively high 
tax collection state (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Tax Collection and Composition in selected Sub-Saharan African countries 
Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics; Fox and Gurley 2005. 
Note: * at $US 2000, market prices 
 
Tax Revenue Trade Taxes GDP/cap 
Lower tax 
countries Years (as % of GDP) 
(as % of total 
taxes) 
(market 
prices/$*) 
Congo (DR) 
1998-
2002 4.5% 32.0% $600
Central African 
Rep. 1992-96 6.1% 39.0% $1,055
Chad  
1994-
2000 6.5% 34.0% $801
Niger  
1994-
2000 7.9% 57.0% $678
Rwanda  1993-99 9.3% 18.0% $931
Tanzania  1992-99 9.6% 35.0% $524
Uganda  
1998-
2003 11.4% 16.0% $1,167
Mozambique 1993-99 11.4% 18.0% $799
Ethiopia  1993-97 12.9% 40.0% $814
Mali  
1991-
2000 12.9% 30.0% $784
Malawi  
1993-
2000 14.2% 15.0% $583
Average   9.7% 30.3% $814
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Higher tax 
countries    
Botswana  1993-98 32.5% 18.0% $8,347
South Africa 
1998-
2002 25.5% 13.0% $8,764
Zimbabwe  1992-97 22.5% 19.0% $2,498
Kenya  
1992-
2001 23.1% 17.0% $1,033
Zambia  1990-99 18.1% 12.0% $785
Cote d’Ivoire 1991-99 18.0% 40.0% $1,582
Senegal  1992-98 16.0% 28.0% $1,427
Nigeria  
1992-
2000 15.2% 18.0% $854
Average   21.4% 20.6% $2,420
average (excl. Botswana, 
S.Africa)    $1,363
 
In the period 2001-2005, total tax revenue in Zambia declined slightly, but still averaged over 
17.5 percent of GDP. To the extent that tax-collection efforts are not built over night, it is 
reasonable to assume that Zambia’s relatively high tax take is not a recent creation.5  
 
Although copper comprises over two-thirds of government revenue,6 Zambia’s tax base is 
more diverse than in most sub-Saharan African countries at low-income levels (Figure 2).  
 
                                                 
5 There are several points worth considering with respect to the data in the table. First, as standard theory 
predicts,  low tax countries tend to have much lower income per capita  and tend be much more reliant on trade 
taxes, which means that the fiscal consequences of trade liberalisation can be devastating if alternate forms of 
tax are not quickly increased. However, income per capita is not necessarily associated with higher tax takes. For 
instance, there are many countries with a lower income per capital than the Central African Republic and 
Uganda that collect a much higher share of taxes as a percentage of GDP. Second, the level of tax collection 
does not necessarily indicate that the state has the capacity to promote rapid economic growth. Uganda, 
Mozambique and Tanzania have been among the fastest growing African economies in the period 1900-2005, 
yet have relatively low tax capacity. South Africa and Zimbabwe have higher tax capacity but have had not had 
nearly as impressive growth rates over the same period. Finally, tax levels do not necessarily indicate that a state 
or government is legitimate. Recent episodes of political violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe, two relatively high 
tax states, are examples that relatively high tax collection does not preclude violent challenges to state authority. 
In these two cases, further research is needed to explain if high tax rates were the result of compliance/consent, 
administrative effectiveness, or unsustainable levels of coercion. 
6 Revenue from copper taxes is collected within the category of trade taxes and VAT in Zambia. 
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Figure 2: Zambia: Types of Taxes as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-2004 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
 
 
All four major types of taxes make some contribution to tax collection, which, along with the 
tax level, indicates broadly the extent of state control over resource mobilisation. Moreover, 
unlike for almost every other sub-Saharan country, personal income taxes brought one of the 
largest shares of revenue in Zambia (Weeks et al. 2004). This indicates a relatively high level 
of taxation from labour income, the implications of which will be discussed later. Finally, 
given the tariff reductions during the 1990s, trade taxes held remarkably steady in their 
contribution, suggesting there to be limited scope for increased revenue from this source, but 
also that trade liberalisation does not necessarily weaken the fiscal base of the state in a low 
income country as has been argued, for example, by Baunsgaard and Keen (2005). 
 
In sum, state resilience in Zambia was based on the ability of the state to maintain two core 
functions: first, there were no major large-scale political challenges to its authority; and 
second, the state maintained a monopoly over tax collection in the territory. The next sections 
attempt to examine how and why this resilience was maintained. 
 
Historical evolution of centralised patronage and stable elite bargains in Zambia 
As argued above, the construction of centralised patronage is central to the prospects of 
creating stable elite bargains, and thus state resilience. Where leaders organise the settlement 
between executive authority and elites (those who command significant social and economic 
power)   through a centralised political party, or a political pact around clearly defined rules, 
they have tended to create a more resilient state. The extent to which regional elites are 
provided economic rents by the executive is central to limiting the prospects of non-state 
challenges to state authority. If the executive’s authority can be vetoed by too many rival elite 
actors this tends towards fragmentation and fragility.  
 
Moreover, the emergence of a dominant political party provides an organisational base to 
such patronage patterns and provides limits on the extent to which the executive can assume 
predatory tendencies. The political organisation of state power needs to incorporate at least 
one veto point to the executive’s authority that can act as a ‘third party enforcer‘ of the rules 
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by which the executive wields authority, which can allow cohesion rather than fragmentation 
of state authority and yet pre-empt a noxious absolute executive authority. High-level party 
cadres − which in practice are comprised of ministers, union leaders and powerful business 
groups − are the main group that provides a check on predatory tendencies of the executive. 
However, in the Zambian case, it will also be shown that urban consumers formed an 
important constituency of the dominant political party and were thus an important check on 
what types of economic policies were politically feasible.  
 
The struggle for independence and the rise of political parties 
The political struggle to overcome colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia is central to 
understanding how national political organisations were created. The rise of African protest 
was, as in many colonial contexts, the result of economic exclusion, exploitation and 
repression.  The basic contours of the colony were as follows.7 
 
The British Mining Company acquired the territory of Northern Rhodesia (then a part of the 
larger Central African Federation colony) in the 1890s mainly for the purposes of mineral 
prospecting.  The company had obtained land rights over the territory by a series of treaties 
with local chiefs. With increasing world demand, the copper-mining industry grew rapidly 
with the value of exports increasing five-fold from 1939 to 1960. 
 
The main beneficiaries of the expansion of mining were the maize-growing areas along the 
railway line in the southern and central provinces. Within the Copperbelt, however, there 
were vast differences between the material standards of Europeans and Africans (Roberts 
1976: 190).  A range of colonial government policies − including taxation of Africans, forced 
labour, land and agricultural policy − contributed to the deterioration in the quality of life in 
the rural agricultural communities and reinforced this situation. For example, African farmers 
were restricted in the crops they could grow in order to limit the income-earning alternatives 
to working in the copper mines.  The mining companies invested in a railway across the 
country and other infrastructure to support their activities, but this infrastructure left rural 
areas virtually untouched. 
 
Northern Rhodesia had an unbalanced development that was aggravated by colonial policy in 
the agricultural sector, which encouraged a small number of European settlers at the expense 
of African farmers.   The main beneficiaries of the expansion of mining were settler farmers 
in fertile maize-growing areas along the railway line in the southern and central provinces 
(Roberts 1976: 190). Native Reserves were established in 1928-1929 for those forcibly 
expelled from this land.  Access to markets by African farmers in the Native Reserves was 
constrained by poor transport, though in Southern Province African farmers increased the 
production of maize for the market.  As a consequence of colonial policy, the incomes in the 
rural agricultural sector remained low and stagnant, prompting migration to the mines and 
other urban areas. 
 
Consistent with the plan for colonial Zambia to be a settler colony, skilled work was reserved 
for Europeans, and Africans were restricted to unskilled labour, formalised by different wage 
scales based on race.  Moreover, there was little investment in education for Africans. The 
colonial government left most of the education in the hands of Christian missions (Roberts 
                                                 
7 This colonial history draws substantially on Roberts (1976), which is the only work on the period that examines 
issues of political economy in a comprehensive manner. There is much scope for historical work on colonial 
Zambia. 
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1976: 191). In fact, the first secondary school opened as late as 1939. In the period 1940-
1950, the government spent thirty times as much on each white child as on each black child 
(Roberts 1976: 194).  Because of both discrimination and lack of schooling, by 1964 the 
average European miner earned seven times what the average African miner earned (Weeks et 
al. 2004).  
 
The first impetus for change came from white settlers themselves. The British South Africa 
Company became a drain on the mineral wealth of Northern Rhodesia. The total levy, in 
royalties and taxation, on the profits of mining was approximately 30 percent, but only 12.5 
percent went to the Northern Rhodesian government in the 1930s (Roberts 1976: 193). By the 
1940s, most Europeans in Northern Rhodesia felt that their position could best be safeguarded 
through some form of closer association with the while settler regime in Southern Rhodesia.  
In 1953, both Rhodesias were joined with Nyasaland in a Central African Federation, and this 
clearly aligned Northern Rhodesia closer to white southern Africa than to the ‘black 
dependencies’ in East Africa (Roberts 1976).  Ironically, however, it was precisely this 
attempt to subordinate Northern Rhodesia to the white south that provoked the rise of popular 
African movements dedicated to overthrowing colonial rule. 
 
African responses to colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia were conditioned by the slow pace of 
economic and social development. Some of the earliest moves toward political organisation 
began in Nyasaland where education of African had advanced the furthest. Nyasas occupied 
most of the clerical posts and other skilled jobs open to Africans in Northern Rhodesia. It was 
from this cadre of workers that the first African political associations in Northern Rhodesia 
were founded in the late 1940s (Roberts 1976: 196). They were also the precursor to national 
political organisations that were to develop a few years later (Simutanyi 2005). 
 
The centre of activity was Mwenzo, where the Scottish Livingstonia mission opened a station, 
eventually known as ‘Livingstonia’ in 1894. Livingstonia had an enormous influence on the 
growth of African protest in Northern Rhodesia. Students at Livingstonia came from a variety 
of backgrounds but rapidly developed a sense of common identity as Africans. African were 
trained to become church leaders and school teachers, and the education they received was 
considered the best in central Africa at the time. Many of the students educated there became 
teachers in the few newly formed schools and the families of this group, including the Kaunda 
family, became political leaders, particularly in Bemba country in the northwest of the 
country. 
 
Roberts (1976: 201-7), however, argues that the modern political history of Northern 
Rhodesia really began  in the late 1930s when the Copperbelt emerged after the depression as 
the economic driving force of the country. The mining towns brought large numbers of 
Africans in close association and conflict with a small number of dominant and exploitative 
European mining owners and colonial officials.  It was in the mining towns that popular 
African protest and discontent first found effective expression through recognised African 
leaders, particularly leaders fighting for workers rights around issues of wages, working 
conditions and the provision of housing. 
 
The first strike of African mineworkers took place in 1935 in Mufulira, which caused 
substantial rioting. Six workers were killed by the colonial police. There were several 
important consequences of this. First, the colonial government strengthened the role of ‘tribal 
councillors’ in order to construct channels of communication between the government and 
workers. The perception that tribal leaders were allies with the colonial government was to 
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undermine their legitimacy once independence became a reality. Second, European workers 
came to fear the growing strength of African workers and themselves formed  the Northern 
Rhodesian Mineworkers Union as a way to protect their own wages and jobs.  This further 
fuelled resentment among African mineworkers. Third, the colonial administration tried to 
divide and conquer the African workforce by giving special privileges to the so-called ‘boss-
boys’, or African foreman in charge of monitoring workers. This temporarily divided the 
African labour union but did nothing to improve the vast differences in wages and living 
conditions between European and African workers. Moreover, the ‘boss-boys’ themselves 
began to resent the fact that they has similar skills and capacities as their European 
counterparts but were being paid far less. 
 
The most important outcome, however, was the formation, from 1942, of the African welfare 
societies that formed in the mining towns of the Copperbelt. They were mostly led by 
teachers, clerks and foreman, but they defended the interests of workers in general (and not 
just mineworkers) and they were considered by Africans to be much more effective than the 
Urban Advisory Councils (set up by the colonial government in collaboration with ‘traditional 
authorities’) in bringing the problems of mining communities to the attention of mining 
companies.  The growth of welfare societies in the Copperbelt encouraged workers to set 
them up in other rural areas. By 1946, a network of welfare societies had developed through 
most parts of the country.  
 
The spread of such societies was facilitated by the fact that the Copperbelt had attracted 
migrant workers from nearly all parts of the country, and these workers maintained ties with 
their home villages throughout the colonial period. This growing network encouraged Dauti 
Yamba, a teacher who had founded the Luanshaya welfare society, to convene a meeting in 
Broken Hill where representatives from all of the welfare societies in Northern Rhodesia met. 
The significance of this meeting was that it led to the formation of the Federation of African 
Societies, which two years later became the Northern Rhodesian Congress, a forerunner and 
the inspiration for the development of the nationalist political parties. The welfare societies 
also provided the guiding light that collective action among workers was necessary to achieve 
improved wages and working conditions; in 1949, the Northern Rhodesian African 
Mineworkers Unions was formed and it represented nearly half of all African mine workers. 
While other unions in railways and road construction formed, the mineworkers union was one 
of the main focal points of the independence struggle that was to ensue. 
 
The rise of an African working class consciousness raised fears among Europeans. One of the 
main strategies employed by Europeans was to lobby for an official merger between the two 
Rhodesias as well as end mining royalties to the Colonial Office. A Federation was achieved 
but the tax take benefited Southern Rhodesia to a far greater extent, which in the end 
undermined the economic logic of amalgamating the two Rhodesias (Roberts 1976: 205).  
However, the proposition of amalgamating the two Rhodesias further threatened the positions 
of African since such an amalgamation would increase the domination of Europeans who 
were wealthier and more numerous in Southern Rhodesia. It was this fear that sparked notions 
of nationalism and led leaders of the Federation of African Societies to form a more explicit 
political organisation: the Northern Rhodesia Congress, whose political base was in the towns 
and among trade unions (Roberts 1976). The welfare societies had built a sufficient network 
in rural areas upon which a national base of support could be built. In 1951, the name was 
changed (and symbolic of its intentions) to the Northern Rhodesia National Congress.8 
                                                 
8 In 1947, Kenneth Kaunda, one of the first graduates of the Munali school (the first secondary school for 
Africans built in Northern Rhodesia), joined a local branch of a welfare society in Mufulira, and led in its 
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The rise of the Northern Rhodesia National Congress did not prevent the construction of a 
Federation of the two Rhodesias. As a result, the popularity and legitimacy of the Congress 
temporarily faded. The decline in Congress’ fortunes also was due to the revival of the copper 
economy in the period 1954-58. Indeed, a major challenger to Congress power among 
Africans emerged in the form of a religious movement in Bemba country: the Lumpa Church, 
founded by Alice Lenshina. The church drove to eradicate witchcraft, but became a focal 
point for many Africans (particularly in the north-east and in the Copperbelt) searching for an 
escape from European domination. 
 
However, subsequent events were to prove fatal to the legitimacy of the colonial government. 
First, the tax revenues generated from mining benefited the more powerful Southern 
Rhodesian government to a far greater extent, which meant that, despite the revival of copper 
prices in the early 1950s, the Northern Rhodesian government was unable to provide 
significant welfare improvements outside (and even within) the Copperbelt. Second, a 
dramatic economic downturn in the mid-1950s (because of dramatic declines in copper 
prices) led to significant unemployment in the Copperbelt.  In the period 1957-1962, jobs in 
construction fell from 66,000 to 24,000, and losing jobs also meant the loss of free housing 
(Roberts 1976: 204). 
 
The economic depression proved decisively constitutive of a push for independence. The 
popularity of the Northern Rhodesia National Congress revived as many new leaders joined 
and fought to unite against the Federation and campaigned for the idea of independence in a 
nation they were calling ‘Zambia’.  The unity of this independence movement was far from 
certain. In 1958, Kenneth Kaunda, the Congress Secretary-General, proposed a more radical 
drive for independence than the Congress President, Harry Nkumbula, did. This led to a split. 
The Kaunda-led faction broke away and formed the Zambia African National Congress 
(ZANC). The ZANC’s main support base was in the north and east, where most people who 
worked in the Copperbelt came from.  Nkumbula, whose main support base was in the 
Southern province, remained Congress president.  In 1959, the colonial government declared 
a ‘state of emergency’ when rumours spread that the ZANC was developing a plot to ‘murder 
Europeans’. The ZANC was banned and several of its leaders, including Kaunda, were jailed. 
This further fuelled African resistance. In 1960, Kaunda was released from jail and assumed 
the leadership of the newly named United National Independence Party (UNIP). 
 
In 1961, the UNIP staged a series of successful campaigns of civil disobedience in the 
northern and eastern parts of the country, where a significant amount of violence directed 
toward government property was occurring.  This forced the government to hold elections 
that the UNIP won with over two-third of the vote. The UNIP dominance in the government 
led to the rapid demise of the Federation and paved the way for independence in 1964.  With 
independence, the UNIP and the post-colonial government came into control of copper 
mineral rights, which was central to the prospects of promoting economic development in the 
post-colonial period. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
transformation into a branch of the Congress. Kaunda would later acknowledge that his experience in the Munali 
school, which was close to the capital, Lusaka, ‘helped me make sense of Northern Rhodesia.  See also Roberts 
(1976: 210-11) on the role that colonial army service and the spread of African radio had in the construction of 
what Anderson calls an ‘imagined community’ among African leaders in Northern Rhodesia. 
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It is important to note that the consolidation of UNIP’s power, while relatively peaceful in 
African terms, did not occur without significant violence. It is also noteworthy that the 
dominance of UNIP was consolidated through a particularly violent destruction of the once 
powerful Lumpa Church. The Lumpa Church had developed a strong following in areas, in 
particular in the north east, that were also UNIP strongholds. The Lumpa were against any 
outside interference in their affairs, and their defiance of government authority led to violent 
clashes that resulted in 700 being killed (Roberts 1976:  221). Most of the Lumpa leaders 
were either killed or detained indefinitely.  
 
It is also important to note how and why a nation comprised of numerous ethnic groups and 
regional interests came to be united under a dominant political party. Regional divisions in 
Zambia have deep roots in history (Roberts 1976). They are not mainly ‘tribal’ divisions. Of 
all the various pre-colonial political units, only the Lozi kingdom had continued to be an 
important focus of resistance to the central government. It is common among politicians and 
journalists to claim that Zambia has seventy-two tribes. Roberts (1976) maintains that this 
statement is based on stereotypes of colonial officials that were both meaningless and 
irrelevant. What is significant is the fact that the country comprises at least nine language 
groups, and although these all belong to the Bantu family, few people are fluent in more than 
two. English is understood by a small minority and there is no common African language 
such as Tanzania enjoys in Swahili. Instead, four main languages have become common for 
different parts of the country: Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and Lozi. 
 
The prevalence of these four common languages is essentially a by-product of colonial 
economics (Roberts 1976: 241). When people came to work in the mines and towns, they first 
became aware of a common identity with people speaking languages close to their own; and 
the patterns of labour migration tended to reinforce this growing sense of regional identity. 
Early patterns of labour migration linked the Lozi and other western peoples to Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa; the Tonga and the eastern people of Southern Rhodesia; and the 
Bemba-speaking peoples of the north-east to Katanga. When the Copperbelt was developed in 
the late 1920s and 1930s, this attracted many Bemba speakers who already worked in 
Katanga. In 1964, nearly half of the African workers on the copper mines came from either 
Northern or Luapula Provinces, while only 2 percent came from Barotse Province, and less 
than 1 percent came from Southern Province (Roberts 1976).  Thus the economic heart of the 
country was dominated by Bemba speakers in the north-east. 
 
These patterns of migration had profound influences on the growth of nationalism in Northern 
Rhodesia. When UNIP took over the struggle against the Federation in 1960, it owed much of 
its support to Bemba speakers: most of them had spent their working lives entirely within the 
territory and many of them were concentrated within a few towns where party organisation 
was relatively easy to develop (Roberts 1976: 242). 
 
In the Southern Province, by contrast, very few people had worked on the Copperbelt and in 
any case, the African National Congress maintained the largest following in the south.  In the 
west, there had been very little popular involvement in mainstream economic and political 
activities. Labour had long flowed south to Livingstone and Rhodesia. This pattern was 
intensified when in the 1940s agents of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
(‘Wenela’) began recruiting in Barotseland and the north-west for recruitment into South 
African mines. In the general elections before independence, UNIP did not receive much 
support in Barotseland, but this was partly due less with solidarity with the emerging nation 
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than to a temporary alliance of interests between UNIP, which wished to abolish the Lozi 
monarchy, and Lozi dissidents who wished to reform it. 
 
In sum, the struggle for independence was based on the substantial development of political 
organisation and the political and organisational construction of a ‘national identity’, which 
was to have a decisive effect on the degree of state resilience in the post-colonial period. It 
also noteworthy that nationalism and dominant political organisation formed around two 
coalescing identities: Bemba-speakers and Copperbelt mineworkers and town dwellers. These 
two factors provided the focal point of collective action that otherwise may not have formed 
in a country with deep ethnic and regional divisions. It remains an important area of research 
within our comparative framework to evaluate the nature of colonial struggles, and assess the 
extent to which struggles for independence were constitutive of a national identity and the 
construction of national political organisations rather than mere personality-led movements − 
which Sandbrook (1985) identifies as common in many sub-Saharan African polities.  
 
Politics and ideas in the First Republic (1964-1972) 
The rise of UNIP as the dominant political party was the main mechanism through which 
centralised patronage and a stable elite bargain emerged. How this became possible was the 
result of a contingent constellation of events as well as the political decisions and ideals of 
UNIP’s leader, Kenneth Kaunda. Pointing to the role that historical contingency plays 
underscores the specific nature of power settlements and organisation. 
 
The first factor that loomed large in creating some sense of unity in post-independence 
Zambia was the role of threats, both internal and external, of which there were various 
sources. First was the threat that continued foreign domination of the copper industry posed. 
The colonial experience had convinced political leaders that wresting control over the main 
natural resource of the country was central to the prospects of state building and economic 
development. The second threat came from the regional powers in Southern Africa. Kaunda 
(1980: 158) argued that Zambia was ‘truly a war baby, born to the sound of gunfire on her 
northern, western and eastern frontiers‘. However, it was to the south that Zambia found itself 
in the position of ‘front-line state‘ – against white-ruled Southern Rhodesia and apartheid 
South Africa. On balance, this external threat proved to be an integrating force as it provided 
Kaunda and UNIP with a focal point that helped define what UNIP and the idea of Zambia 
stood for in world and regional affairs.9 The third major threat, and one consistently 
emphasised by Kaunda and UNIP, was the threat of inter-ethnic and regional conflict. Kaunda 
and the UNIP leadership were convinced that limited political party competition was the key 
to avoiding a spiralling of ethnic tensions (Burnell 2005). 
 
A second important unifying force was found in the background and ideas of Kaunda himself.  
Kaunda is one of the few politicians in Zambia who can claim to be a truly national figure. 
Most politicians, however unfairly, are identified with some regional interest. Kaunda was 
never considered someone who belonged to a specific ‘tribe’: he was born in Bemba country 
but his parents came from Nyasaland. This fact has given Kaunda a unique authority (Roberts 
1976: 247).  However, the maintenance of national unity and political order in Zambia 
resulted from political action, and in particular Kaunda’s leadership skills and the 
construction of an inclusive political organisational. Kaunda developed and promoted a 
                                                 
9 It remains an open question as to why South Africa did not destabilise internal politics in Zambia, despite her 
resistance to the apartheid regime. Burnell (2005) suggests that it was due to Kaunda’s skill in foreign relations 
and to the weakness of the Zambian army, which posed little threat. Neither explanation seems convincing. 
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nationalist political philosophy known as ‘humanism’ (first presented to the nation in 1967), 
which claims to be socialist in principle. The idea was inspired by the ideals set out by Julius 
Nyerere in the Arusha Decleration. In practice, Zambia’s ‘humanism’ is much less radical that 
Tanzanian socialism of the early Nyerere period. Kaunda identifies ‘humanism’ with ‘African 
democratic socialism’, but he condones private property and seeks to avoid, rather than 
encourage, class conflict (Roberts 1976: 246).10   
 
Ideas alone do not make for political unity, and at independence Zambia was still far from 
being one nation. After the first election in 1962, UNIP emerged as the most successful party 
in terms of its forming nation-wide electoral support. The one main African party that 
challenged UNIP’s dominance was the African National Congress (ANC), which drew its 
support from the Southern province and sections of Eastern and Western provinces. The two 
parties formed an alliance in 1962 to ensure that the white settler parties would remain minor 
actors in parliament. However, in 1964 the UNIP won an outright majority and formed a 
government without forming a coalition with the ANC.  
 
The UNIP government that took control of Zambia at independence was deliberately 
composed of leaders from almost all parts of the country; only the north-west was 
unrepresented in the cabinet. This ethnic and regional balancing was to be a cornerstone of 
what made UNIP a legitimate national party and what prevented challenges to its authority 
(Molteno 1974; Posner 2005; Burnell 2005; Simutanyi 2005; Van Donge 1995. Lindemann 
2009).11 In the military the post-independence government recognised that ethno-regional 
imbalances had played a major role in military interventions across sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. 
in the Congo, Tanzania or Uganda). As a consequence, it abolished all racial or ethnic 
discrimination in recruitment for the Zambia Defence Force. This inclusive approach helped 
to ensure effective civil control of the military. As no single faction dominated the army, the 
possibility of one ethnic group organising a successful military coup d’état was very remote. 
On the whole, the UNIP government seemed initially well on the way to forging an inclusive 
and stable elite bargain.  
 
However, UNIP was widely regarded by the ANC as essentially a ‘Bemba party’, while the 
African National Congress, the main rival party at the time, was seen by many people in 
UNIP as a ‘Tonga party’ (Simutanyi 2005).  The ANC did not pose a threat to UNIP in 
national electoral terms, but ANC strength in the south challenged UNIP’s claim to embody 
the whole nation of Zambia.  
 
Despite the efforts at creating an inclusive elite bargain and accommodation, there was 
substantial resentment and antagonism among regional political leaders whose power was 
being eroded by Kaunda’s growing power within UNIP. In 1966, a former UNIP cabinet 
minister, Naluminio Mundia, formed the United Party (UP), protesting the marginalisation of 
the Lozi people and the Western province more generally in the allocation of state resources. 
The UP had strong support among the Lozi in the Western province and those that worked in 
the Copperbelt. In a first important move toward centralising power, the government 
                                                 
10 Indeed, Kaunda’s ‘humanism’ is rooted more in his Christian beliefs and the ideals of mutual respect and co-
operation rather than in a detailed socialist program (Roberts 1976: 246). 
11 For instance, the post-independence UNIP Central Committee (CC) – the key organ of the ruling party with 
formidable powers – was also fairly balanced in composition (Lindeman 2009). Significantly, the 1964 CC 
included the key leaders of all main factions, including S. Kapwepwe (Bemba), R. Kamanga (Nyanga), S. Wina 
(Lozi) and M. Chona (Tonga). 
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outlawed the UP in 1968, detained most of its leaders, and accused the UP of stoking ethnic 
rivalry and national disorder. 
 
The road to political dominance for UNIP had to overcome some important political 
challenges.  Former supporters of UP switched their allegiance to the ANC, who subsequently 
won all of the parliamentary seats allocated to Western province in the 1969 elections and 
was responsible for the lowest number of presidential votes Kaunda had received as head of 
UNIP. Within UNIP, the party conference in 1967 experienced intense faction-fighting along 
ethnic and regional lines. Kaunda’s position as leader was not questioned, but the there was 
substantial conflict over which leaders would occupy the vice-presidency and other senior 
positions.  Two tribal blocs formed in the competition to secure party leadership: the Tonga-
Bemba alliance and the Lozi-Nyanja alliance. Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe of the Tonga-
Bemba alliance won the vice-presidency, but the acrimonious nature of the battle threatened 
to split UNIP. This battle convinced Kaunda to exercise more authoritarian control over the 
party; he subsequently reduced the power of the vice-president and secretary general of the 
party and froze the number of central committee members. Kaunda was to later suspend 
elections for the central party committee and replace them with a list of leaders loyal to this 
reign as party chairman.12   
 
In 1970, Vice-President Mwansa Kapwepwe resigned and formed the United Progressive 
Party (UPP) on the grounds that Kaunda had was marginalising leaders from his tribal group, 
the Bemba. This challenge had important political economy implications, since the UPP was 
popular not only in the Northern Province but also in the Copperbelt provinces, which was the 
main driver of capital accumulation, growth and fiscal resource mobilisation in the economy. 
UPP victories in parliamentary by-elections and its growing popularity threatened UNIP’s 
dominance. The rise of UPP posed a fundamental threat to UNIP. In 1968, UNIP had lost 
three provinces to the ANC; and had UPP taken the Northern Province and the Copperbelt, it 
would have lost five of the nine provinces and become a minority party (Bates and Collier 
1993: 398). The government outlawed UPP in 1971, again on the grounds that it was causing 
rising ethnic tension that might result in political violence.  The UPP threat was one of the 
main reasons that led Kaunda and other UNIP leaders to introduce a one-party state by 
legislation. 
 
Despite challenges from ANC and UPP, UNIP was clearly the only party with a national 
reach. UNIP had a ‘first mover’ advantage in organisational terms, given the coalescing of 
Bemba and Copperbelt working class interests developed during the independence struggle 
(as discussed above).  This meant that, in reality, the term ‘multi-party competition’ may be a 
bit misleading to define this period. Rather, Zambia was characterised as more of a dominant 
party rather than a multi-party state. In this sense, the First Republic saw substantial 
centralisation of power in the form of UNIP’s dominance. As such, post-colonial politics were 
shaped more by conflict and competition within UNIP rather than between parties (Baylies 
and Szefte 1992); and much of this competition consisted of regional and sectional power 
brokers, all competing for influence and power at the centre, which is why clientelist politics 
dominated UNIP’s activities. That such clientelist competition took place around one party 
was central to prospects of the consolidation of centralised patronage.13 
                                                 
12 What is not clear in the literature is why the military and other regional leaders within UNIP allowed this 
move to consolidate so quickly. The most obvious explanation is that Kaunda had the most national power base 
among UNIP leaders.  
13 There is clearly the danger that factionalism within the dominant party could split the party, which is why the 
decision of the government to control many spheres of the economy in 1974 was to cement the need for 
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By 1972, the UNIP convinced the ANC to disband. The pact between UNIP and the ANC 
was signed in Southern province district of Choma and later became known as the ‘Choma 
Decleration‘.  The UNIP provided the ‘carrots’ of high-level posts within UNIP and the 
government. At this stage, the road to a one-party state was well paved. Kaunda announced 
that the cabinet had decided to introduce a one-party state as response to inter-ethnic tensions 
and inter-party political violence. In this light, one of the main sources of political stability in 
Zambia can be traced to deliberate policies to reduce electoral competition, which, in other 
contexts, have generated substantial political violence (Synder 2000). 
 
Finally, UNIP’s power was further re-enforced due to the subversion and weakness of 
traditional forms of authority. There is a general consensus that chiefs as a whole have 
exercised remarkably little political power on the national scale in Zambia since 
independence. Although some chiefs supported the nationalist movement, many others, 
including the Litunga of the Lozi, were seen as collaborators with the colonial regime 
(Duncan et al. 2003: 46).14  Gould (2006) notes that Kaunda subverted any overt challenges to 
his authority while conveying a powerful symbolic message to rural subjects about the 
subsidiarity of their local leaders.  Kaunda was careful to grant traditional leaders the 
traditional trappings of respect, but in terms of political or administrative authority, their 
powers were limited to usufructary land distribution and arbitration in minor civil disputes. In 
land-abundant countries such as Zambia, the sanctioning of this type of authority had little 
political or economic significance. 
 
Centralised patronage and the one-party state: politics in the Second Republic (1972-1991) 
The consolidation of centralised rule was achieved with the capacity of UNIP to disband or 
co-opt contending political parties. This section examines how centralised patronage operated 
within the one-party state and why it was effective in maintaining political order. It will also 
be seen that the very mechanisms employed to accommodate elites and urban constituencies 
of UNIP were also dysfunctional to the prospects of effective economic development. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the single most important factor that led to political stability was the 
general policy of the Kaunda regime to provide important cabinet posts to all main regional 
and ethnic groups in the country. Patrimonialism was not only centralised, it was also 
encompassing of all elites and prevented regional challenges to state authority. Most of the 
literature on Zambia stresses this point (Burnell 2005; Baylies and Szeftel 1992; Molteno 
1974; Simutanyi 2005; Duncan et al. 2003). This pattern of distributing patronage in an 
inclusive manner across regional and ethnic elites was invariable among Zambian presidents 
throughout the period 1970-2008 (Lindeman 2009). 
 
Second, the executive promoted the ‘militarisation’ of the civilian sphere, whereby high-
ranking army representatives were included in the National Assembly, the government and 
the ruling party. This began as early as 1973 when Kaunda nominated the three heads of the 
armed services to Parliament and made all three Ministers of State. This approach was 
maintained throughout the Second Republic, with many current or former army officers 
appointed to cabinet or the UNIP CC. Significantly, the officer corps was deliberately drawn 
from all parts of the country. While detailed information on the composition of entire corps is 
                                                                                                                                                        
contending power brokers to deal directly with the executive. 
14 Attempts over the years to organise ‘traditionalist’ parties in the Western Province, usually seen as the most 
conservative part of the country, have met with very little electoral success (Duncan et al. 2003: 46).  
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not available, a close look at all military commanders between 1973 and 1991 shows that all 
major language groups had substantial representation at one time or another (Lindeman 
2009). Moreover, Kaunda frequently reshuffled top army officers to prevent them from 
building up their own power base.  
 
Third, a key characteristic of UNIP is that it is a multi-ethnic and multi-regional party that 
does not systematically represent or develop policies that bias in favour of one ethnic group.15  
As Burnell (2005: 119) notes: 
‘Kaunda, a master of the ethnic and provincial arithmetic when making 
appointments, endeavoured to maintain loyalties across the political spectrum 
both through formal policies that dispensed public goods like spending on 
education and informal neo-patrimonial interventions, all managed within the 
inclusionary structures of the single party…. for many years the urban population 
continued to experience the benefits of subsidised maize (the nation’s staple food) 
peasant farmers however remote from the line of rail enjoyed guaranteed sales, 
and industrial workers were kept largely quiescent through industrial protectionist 
policies and concessions to their wage demands. This political economy approach 
to maintaining political stability proved largely effective until the mid-1980s. And 
although socioeconomic inequalities (especially urban-rural) existed, policy 
towards managing the country’s social and economic affairs was not ethnicised in 
ways that were highly discriminatory.‘  
 
Under the constitution of the Second Republic, introduced in 1973, Zambia became a one-
party state, with UNIP as the governing party. Informally, the political authorities were 
referred to as ‘the Party and its government‘ and Party and state positions became 
interchangeable (Simutanyi 2005). As such, the division between the state and party 
essentially disappeared.  No political party was allowed to be registered by law and the UNIP 
constitution was an appendix to the national Constitution (Burnell 2005).  
 
The Secretary-General of the Party was the leader, and the Prime Minister was second in 
command. Almost all major economic and political decisions were made in the Party’s 
Central Committee. All of the usual ministries reported to the executive, and economic and 
political power is centralised. All cabinet ministers were appointed by President Kaunda. The 
cabinet defined and implanted all economic policies, and the Central Committee was 
responsible for presenting them in political and moral terms. In general, the cabinet and the 
ministers had the most influence principally because they were given vast resources and 
access to expert staff. 
 
UNIP controlled nearly all the paths through which access to state resources and employment 
in the formal sector could be obtained. These included tariff protection, subsidised 
agricultural inputs, subsidised credit, state enterprise jobs and preferential exchange rates. The 
Party monopolised office holding at the national, provincial and municipal level. To rise in 
the civil service or military, one had to be a member of UNIP. In 1985, for instance, UNIP 
filled over 40,000 local offices at the section, branch and ward level in the capital, Lusaka, 
alone. 
                                                 
15 As Simutanyi (2005: 38) notes: ‘The implication for Zambia, as discussed in the context of the structure of the 
party system, is that ethnicity is not politically mobilised in a way that could be considered as a destabilising or 
even as a centrifugal force – and is even still far from being the major force for the fragmentation of the party 
system into ethnic parties, such as in the case of Kenya.‘ 
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By centralising and controlling politics and patronage, the only way elites could advance 
economically was to bargain with the party and its government. Party office became 
dependent on executive patronage − a strategy exemplified in the slogan ‘it pays to belong to 
UNIP’ (Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 79). In essence the UNIP leadership acted on the idea that 
replacing fractious multi-party competition with one-party participatory democracy would 
make the distribution of spoils more predictable and stable. As Kaunda (cited in Gertzel et al. 
1984: 17) himself pointed out: 
The One-Party Democracy will help us weed out political opportunists…It has 
been fashionable in the past for any Party member…to threaten to quit, or indeed 
quit, the Party to join the opposition; for any civil servant…to threaten to 
quit…for any businessman denied a license or a loan on perfectly legal grounds to 
run to the opposition, the hope that if they formed the Government, he would be 
favoured. This era in which the politics of patronage has been a feature of life is 
gone.  
In essence, the implementation of one-party rule created incentives for elites to bargain with 
the state rather than exit and form challenges to state authority. 
 
In order to make centralised patronage a reality, two things need to be achieved. The first was 
political party presence throughout the territory, and the second was effective control over 
economic resources. One-party dominance would not have worked if either of these two tasks 
were not achieved. Political control is not effective unless the dominant party controls a 
substantial share of resource allocation.16   
 
The Party achieved widespread penetration in all sections of the country. UNIP’s most basic 
unit, the section, consisted of households. The sections contained between 10 and 25 houses; 
the branches, approximately a dozen sections; and wards, two to three branches. In rural 
areas, a ward would contain several villages; in the urban areas, a township would contain 
several wards. In these local units, offices were filled by ballot, with only UNIP members 
eligible to vote.  In each district in Zambia, a district governor, political secretary, and 
executive secretary headed all government departments. These positions were all filled by 
appointments made in the Central Committee of the Party.  Each province in the Second 
Republic was made up of several districts, and district officials were subordinate to a 
provincial member of the of the Central Committee, assisted by a provincial political 
secretary and a permanent secretary, all of whom were appointed by the Central Committee. 
The provincial minister was also a member of the Central Committee of the Party, which 
consisted of approximately twenty members. Like the members of the Central Committee, the 
provincial members were nominated as part of a slate of candidates chosen by the Party 
president.17 The slate of candidates was ratified by the National Council and approved by the 
Party Congress, the two main representative organs of the Party. For most of the Second 
Republic, there was little competition for positions on the Central Committee. This both made 
the distribution of economic rents and political privileges stable and predictable, but made the 
polity vulnerable to opposition in the context of economic decline, as will be seen below. 
 
                                                 
16 In this sense, the fact that Zambia has one, essentially ‘non-lootable’ mineral resource, copper, certainly 
reduced the prospects of significant capital accumulation outside of state control, the development of which can  
be politically de-stabilising (Le Billon 2001a & b).  
17 The number of members on the Central Committee expanded to 40 or so members in the last years of the 
Second Republic. 
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State control over the economy was also central to centralising patronage and forcing elites to 
bargain with UNIP.18 As a result, widespread nationalisation of the economy was 
implemented, a process that was legitimate and standard practice in most post-colonial states 
in the 1960s, and one that was supported at the time by the Bretton Woods organisations. The 
Mulungushi Revolution announced the intentions of the ruling party to take control of the 
commanding heights of the economy from foreign capital (Burdette 1984). The revolution 
refers to the sequential nationalisations of portions of the retail, commercial, mining, 
manufacturing, banking and insurance sectors. The major reforms were carried out between 
1968 and 1971. 
 
The primary means of gaining state control was implemented through ZIMCO (Zambia 
Industrial and Mining Corporation), the largest state holding company. ZIMCO controlled the 
mining sector and related activities.19 The government nationalised copper in 1969. It also 
controlled energy: an oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam, a refinery, and hydroelectric plants in 
Kafue and Kariba. It controlled transport: railways, roads and bus services, and the national 
airline. It also had substantial financial holdings, including two banks, a building society and 
the nation’s insurance industry. It also dominated tourism and trade. Through the INDECO 
group of companies, ZIMCO controlled over one-half the manufacturing sector. By the mid-
1980s, two-thirds of all formal sector employment was in either the government or in a public 
enterprise.  The government throughout the 1980s was responsible for almost all formal 
employment in mining and services, and two-fifths of total formal wage employment in 
construction and manufacturing. ZIMCO accounted for over 80 percent of export earnings 
and most of the tax-revenue collection. 
 
The role of ZIMCO and other state companies in maintaining patronage through state 
employment is well documented. The number of state employees increased from 22,500 in 
1964 to 51,000 in 1969, and the state was recruiting labour at four times the rate of the private 
sector in the 1970s (Rakner 2003). Even during times of severe economic recession (for 
example between 1975 and 1977), total public employment increased from 124,760 to 
126,260 in the government sector and from 116,150 to 128,350 in the parastatal, at a time 
when private sector employment fell from 120,320 to 98,730 (Szeftel 1982: 6). The 
maintenance of welfarist policies more generally, even during period of structural adjustment 
and economic downturn, was characteristic in the Second Republic.  
 
UNIP maintained strong ties with ZIMCO. In the 1980s, twelve of the twenty-two directors of 
ZIMCO held membership in the Central Committee of UNIP, as did the director general and 
head of ZIMCO’s management. In the face of mounting losses of ZIMCO, due to declining 
copper prices and mismanagement, the government reduced the power of respective company 
managers and further centralised power in the board of directors of ZIMCO. The government 
also used its control over ZIMCO to reduce consumer prices In order to enable firms to be 
able to produce sufficient supplies of basic consumer items at low cost, the government 
provided abundant allotments of foreign exchange, priorities in the allocation of import 
licenses, and subsidised credit for capital expansion. The INDECO companies were 
particularly favoured as they provided many of the processed food items and other basic 
                                                 
18 It is important to note that the nationalisation of the economy was driven largely by the ideological leanings of 
the UNIP leaders, and in particular Kaunda’s vision of state-led economic development. In this perspective, 
UNIP control over patronage was perhaps more a by-product of the UNIP leadership’s ideology than it was an 
explicit strategy to control and centralise patronage flows. I thank Peter McDermott and Alan Whitworth for 
bring this point to my attention. 
19 The discussion of ZIMCO’s operations draws on Bates and Collier (1993). 
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consumer goods. Price control on maize and fertiliser subsidies to farmers was also central to 
the plan of keeping urban consumer goods prices in check. ZIMCO thus represented an 
important resource for UNIP. 
 
A central mechanism to maintain state and Party legitimacy was to provide cheap food prices 
to urban residents, a main support base for UNIP. This was also achieved through state 
control of the economy in the form of marketing boards. The agricultural policies 
implemented after independence were also based on rural policy objectives such as reducing 
the dominance of large-scale expatriate commercial farmers, and seeking to ensure fairness, 
national unity and economic justice (Sandberg 1990).  
 
In 1971, the Zambian government mandated uniform, trans-regional crop pricing with the 
intention of equalising the market position of all ethnic groups and regions. In 1973, the 
National Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) was designated as the sole purchaser of maize and 
cotton in order to ensure fair and adequate agricultural distribution.  The marketing 
arrangement provided some benefits to the widely dispersed smallholder farming community 
in terms of guaranteed prices, provision of transport and storage. But NAMBOARD proved 
unable to adequately perform its task because of chronic late payments to farmers and the 
inability to transport crops in a timely fashion. It also limited the expansion of large-scale 
farmers by limiting crop prices, which was one of the explicit tradeoffs between the 
maintenance of political stability and the promotion of economic development that 
characterised the Second Republic. This was seen with the co-existence of political stability 
with dismal agricultural growth performance (an issue I return to below).   
 
Even though there was no inter-party political competition, UNIP did attempt to re-enforce its 
legitimacy by mobilising votes for the party ticket. The stability of food prices was the most 
important concern for urban dwellers. In search of urban votes in particular, UNIP used its 
command in urban township councils as a principal strategy. The local councils belonged to 
UNIP and only those who were members of UNIP could vote in council elections.  The local 
governments had the power to control township markets. In the effort to secure local votes, 
the Party attempted to enforce price controls and even lower prices in order to gain 
popularity. In fact, the government consistently refused to withdraw costly maize subsidy (the 
staple food in the country), despite IMF and World Bank pressure. Many analysts trace the 
collapse of economic reform in the mid-1980s in Zambia to the riots of December 1986 over 
the price of maize. In the 1980s, the maize subsidy consumed between 10 and 20 percent of 
the government budget (Bates and Collier 1993: 401-4). 
 
Through their power to license traders in the township markets, the urban councils controlled 
entry. By limiting entry, UNIP provided traders with the possibility of earning economic 
rents. In exchange the Party asked political favours from traders, which included requiring 
them to participate in demonstrations and rallies, and it solicited their help in turning out the 
vote.  The most important service demanded, however, was the maintenance of stable and low 
food prices. In order to ensure low food prices and ensure economic rents for the traders, the 
Party used its leverage over the ministries setting food prices and the INDECO production 
companies to make sure that farm gate prices were low by subsidising inputs into food 
production. The Treasury and the INDECO companies bore the brunt of these subsidies, 
which were dependent on copper prices and production remaining buoyant. 
 
There is also evidence that the Party used its control over licensing, credit and land allocation 
to promote explicit primitive accumulation for high-level party elites in agriculture, banking, 
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industry and commerce as well as providing the highest level positions in state enterprises 
(Szeftel 1982; Baylies and Szeftel 1982; Bates and Collier 1993). UNIP promoted the 
development of a Zambian producer class by placing restrictions on the remittance of profits 
of non-indigenous-owned firms, subsidising loans for foreign citizens in light manufacturing 
and retail, and by manipulating licensing laws.20  Generally, those seeking prominent 
positions in the government and in business strove to secure top positions in the Party, which 
contributed to the centralisation of rent deployment throughout the polity. 
 
The rise of centralised political and economic control in the polity and state-led dominance of 
the economy generated paths of primitive accumulation and economic privileges. That is, 
producer interests themselves came to be defined as the result of the Party largely dictating 
who was to become a privileged asset owner or a privileged worker.21 The command of the 
Party and the executive meant state control over the economy made interest groups dependent 
on the state for capital accumulation, but not in the traditional corporatist sense since there 
seems to be too little organisational power on the part of economic interest groups to dictate 
the terms of economic policy.  Investigating how political and economic positions interacted 
is essential for understanding ongoing processes of class formation and assessing why 
traditional ‘interest groups’ themselves were themselves weak autonomous actors (Baylies 
and Szeftel 1982). 
 
Economic underdevelopment of the non-copper economy is the most important feature to 
consider. The number of Zambian property owners at independence was miniscule as foreign 
owners in mining, agriculture, manufacturing and trade dominated economic activity. In the 
period 1964-1975, the state nationalised many industries, including copper, which altered the 
balance of economic power between the state and foreign and resident non-Zambian owners. 
By 1970, public enterprises accounted for over 60 percent of gross domestic product and 
accounted for one-third of all employees outside the central government.  Apart from majority 
ownership of copper, the public enterprises accounted for over 54 percent of manufacturing 
production.22 In 1973, only 9 percent of all land was owned privately by indigenous farmers.  
The modest if important growth of the Zambian capitalist class in the Second Republic was 
the result of state policies to promote such a group through the assignment of assets and 
credits. Such a class developed not only through the ‘Zambianisation’ of parastatal managers, 
but also by distributing ‘private’ economic rents to top levels of the Party, civil service and 
parastatal managers. As Baylies and Szeftel (1982: 196) note:  
‘The particularly close association of the emergent bourgeoisie with the state 
apparatus is reflected not only in the background of the new bourgeoisie (those 
with party and public enterprise contacts), but also in the fact that of all those who 
held cabinet office from 1964, half had farms or business interests by 1976. 
Another 10 percent had smallholdings of less than 100 acres on state land.‘  
                                                 
20 At the same time, the Party adopted policies that limited the growth of the private sector economy. This was 
achieved by promoting state-owned enterprises, which were given several privileges including subsidised credit, 
privileged access to import licenses and tax concessions.  In retail trade, the state imposed price controls on key 
consumer items and set up state-owned retail outlets that undercut private competition. 
21 Bates and Collier (1993) and Rakner (2001) argue that an outstanding feature of the polity was the extent to 
which organised interests stood isolated from the Party in terms of their ability to dictate economic policy. UNIP 
numbered among its enemies a large portion of commercial farmers (both expatriate and African), and private 
businessmen in trade and industry. The relationship with organised labour was more ambiguous.  This portrayal 
is misleading since it adopts a strict distinction between state and non-state actors. 
22 In the private sector, Zambian capital was still a minor player in 1973: of the 84 construction and engineering 
firms with more than 100 employees, only three were owned by indigenous Zambians as compared with twenty-
five by foreign companies and twenty-five by non-Zambian residents. The rest were owned by the state. 
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Privileging party insiders to accumulate capital was one of the main mechanisms through 
which contending regional interests were accommodated within the polity and the Party.23  
 
Particularly important was the insistence of the government that among Zambian directors of 
foreign companies, a certain number should also be appointed to the boards of commercial 
banks. This not only was a mechanism for the party to deploy privileges to powerful Zambian 
elites, but it also created a group of directors closely linked to the political system and 
prepared to be an effective voice for foreign capital. The links foreign capital had with UNIP 
was one of the main reasons why the ‘private sector’ business associations were not effective 
in promoting a nationalist manufacturing strategy and why the pressure to resist economic 
liberalisation in the 1990s was so weak (as discussed below). 
 
The link between private indigenous enterprise and the state is not just one of outward 
movement from the state apparatus to the private sector (Baylies and Szeftel 1982: 196). 
Given the state’s control over the economy, there has been a tendency for private business to 
seek political contacts or an active role in the political process.24  This can be seen in the 
backgrounds of nominees and elected members of Parliament in Zambia’s first election: about 
40 percent of those who placed their names under consideration had business interests.   
 
It is worth noting that ex-patriot business groups were also a part of the elite bargain that 
emerged in the post-independence period. Asian and European capitalists were permitted to 
continue their investments, and some non-Africans were later to become parliament members 
in the Third Republic (1991 to the present).25 Moreover, white settlers played an important 
part in the maintenance of business pressure groups such as the Zambia National Farmers’ 
Union and Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. While some 
Zambian businessmen resent the apparent dominance of these organisations by expatriates or 
non-indigenous Zambians, there is general acceptance of their role (Duncan et al. 2003: 10).    
 
The economic and social indicators available for Zambia broadly support the proposition that 
UNIP spread the benefits relatively evenly across large part of the countryside at the same 
time that there were elites who were receiving substantial economic privileges or rents from 
the centralised system of patronage. First, the very unequal distribution of income in the 
country is consistent with the appropriation of wealth by a small number of UNIP party 
cadres and business men. Second, the distribution of poverty that prevailed in the country 
suggests that urban areas were, on average, much less poor than their rural counterparts 
(notwithstanding the case that there is substantial social differentiation within each category) 
(Table 3). 
 
                                                 
23 See Baylies and Szeftel (1982) and Szeftel (1982) on case examples of this process in land allocation, access 
to banking credit and in the deployment of manufacturing and construction licenses. These authors also point out 
that there was significant corruption in this process, which is not surprising since nearly all form of primitive 
accumulation are likely to contain some element of corruption (Khan 2006). 
24 The state also purposefully controlled the growth of those capitalists that were given privileges by 
nationalising particularly successful businesses. This created growing animosity among the new business groups 
who were among the most vocal supporters to end one-party rule by the late 1980s (Baylies and Szeftel 1982: 
196). 
25 Kaunda’s relatively benign treatment of ex-patriot capitalists was similar to Nyerere’s policy in Tanzania, 
which can be contrasted with Idi Amin’s policy of expelling Asian businessmen in Uganda in the 1970s. What is 
important about Kaunda’s stance is that it symbolised the notion that UNIP stood for universal citizenship in the 
country and did not represent any particular racial or ethnic group.  
 28
Table 3: Poverty Incidence by province: Zambia: 1991-2003 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
 
Province 1991 1998 2003 % of population (2003) 
All Zambia 69 75 67 10,757,192
 Rural 88 86 74 65.1
 Urban 46 58 52 34.9
Province  
Central 70 79 69 10.2
Copperbelt 56 67 59 15.9
Eastern 84 83 71 13.4
Luapula 84 85 70 7.9
Lusaka 31 54 56 13.9
Northern 84 85 81 12.7
North-
western 
78 76 72 
5.9
Southern 78 78 63 12.4
Western 85 90 65 7.6
 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt are the two main urban areas, and their poverty rates are 
substantially less than the other regions, which are mostly rural (see below for an account of 
why urban poverty has increased more recently). This is consistent with the UNIP 
maintaining low food prices in urban areas and providing substantial and relatively well paid 
employment in the government and parastatals. Also note that the poverty rates within rural 
areas are very similar across the country, which suggests that no particular region has been 
favoured in the distribution of state patronage. There is also evidence that education 
enrolment and test scores are similar in all of the regions of the country outside Lusaka and 
the Copperbelt, where indicators are considerably better (Das et al. 2004: 26). 
 
The one main group that UNIP did not fully co-opt and/or secure loyalty from involved the 
strong national labour unions.  This was not always the case. In the early days of African 
resistance, the trade union and nationalist movements, led by UNIP, developed close links, as 
they fought against racial discrimination and fought for economic and political equality. In 
fact, a generation of UNIP leaders rose through the ranks of the trade union movement in the 
Copperbelt with some important political figures such as Wilson Chakulya and John Chisata 
become ministers in the post-independence government (Bates and Collier 1993: 396).  
 
However, post-independence relations became more precarious. The Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU) had approximately 350,000 members, which comprised 70 percent of 
the formal labour force by 1990.  Due to its strategic position in urban centres, labour unions 
have been influential in Zambian political life (Rakner 2003).  The strongest national unions 
had a narrow agenda of fighting for better pay and working conditions, while the UNIP had a 
broader political agenda which included keeping work stoppages to a minimum in order to 
pressure the colonial government or to terminate work stoppages so as to gain confidence 
among the wider electorate (Roberts 1976: 242; Bates and Collier 1993: 396).  This resulted 
early in the independence period in considerable Party-labour union conflicts (Bates and 
Collier, 1993: 396).   
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With the development of public enterprises, the Party sought to maintain labour discipline and 
control housing and public service community in the mines and elsewhere, which undercut 
the influence of trade unions. The UNIP also ran candidates in union elections as part of its 
effort to control as much of the economy as possible (Bates and Collier, 1993: 396).  There 
were, however, significant efforts at co-opting union leaders. This was done by the Party 
placing union leaders in the boards of directors of state-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, the 
ZCTU was considered one of the strongest labour unions in sub-Saharan Africa (Rakner 
1992). 
 
A key moment in Party-union relations was the state-led 1971 Industrial Relations Act, which 
made ZCTU affiliation mandatory for union registration. The 1971 Act strengthened the 
powers of the party and government in industrial relations through clauses regulating strike 
activity and the industrial relations court.  As ZCTU at the time was led by close political 
allies to UNIP, there was little objection to the growth in UNIP’s power over industrial 
relations since the act increased the organisational capacity and power of the trade-union 
movement as a whole. The mandatory affiliation to one central congress ensured the 
enforcement of the policy of ‘one industry one union’ and thus granted the unions and 
organisational monopoly, unifying the union movement. Such a monopoly greatly improved 
the financial position of the trade unions (Rakner 2003). 
 
Ironically, however, rather than gaining control over the union through state-corporatist 
measures, the UNIP government instead created one of the best organised and financially 
protected union movements on the continent. UNIP officials interviewed in 1991 emphasised 
the unintended consequences of the 1971 Act, and saw the legislation as one of the great 
mistakes of UNIP. ZCTU was the most powerful non-state association in Zambia throughout 
the First and Second Republics (Rakner 2003).  
 
Thus, there is much less consensus in the literature on the extent to which UNIP secured a 
relatively powerful position vis-à-vis labour unions. Collier and Bates (1993) and Rakner 
(2003) in particular argue that UNIP did not fully co-opt labour. However, there is evidence 
that UNIP did maintain some leverage over labour. First, personal income tax is relatively 
high in Zambia, which suggests that the state-labour relations were far from antagonistic. If 
they were, then the collection of personal income tax would have been far more difficult. 
Second, UNIP controlled access to well-paid jobs, which would indicate that unions did not 
have autonomous power over employment policy. However, it is the case that wage demands 
by unions have been met by the state even in the face of economic declines (Rakner 2003: 49-
50). The significance of this tense semi-autonomous relationship between the Party and the 
unions will be addressed below. 
 
In sum, the Second Republic was characterised by the consolidation of one party rule and 
centralised patronage patterns. As suggested in the first section, such a pattern proved 
instrumental to the construction of a stable and predictable elite bargain, which conferred 
substantial economic rents and privileges to most of the main regional elites.  This in turn 
contributed to the absence of violent challenges to state authority. This is not to say that the 
one-party state did not engage in some repression or more other heavy handed tactics 
(Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003) or that the polity was free from conflict. However, in relative 
terms, Zambia was peaceful during the Second Republic. The maintenance of this bargain, as 
we have seen, was dependent on buoyant revenues from copper, which proved to be 
ephemeral. What is notable about the 1980s is that the state maintained welfarist policies for 
its core constituents far longer than it might have had it introduced full blown economic 
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liberalisation. The price of failing to reform eventually emerged in spiralling inflation, and an 
unsustainable external debt position. 
 
The mechanisms through which political stability was maintained severely undermined the 
prospects of developing growth poles, including in the copper sector itself. There was 
substantial nepotism and corruption within most of the parastatals and a clear shortage of 
skilled workers. In industry, protection rents were deployed on political rather than economic 
criteria, and there was no evidence that the state was able to force the recipients of infant 
industry protection to reach any recognisable set of performance criteria.  As a result, infant 
industries failed to grow up and added to the drain, along with parastatals, on national 
reserves. 
 
In agriculture, marketing-board policies were largely anti-developmental. It is important to 
understand the political economy factors driving these processes. State agricultural policies, 
while benefiting urban consumers, were clearly ineffective in terms of expanding agricultural 
production and productivity. There were several reasons for this. First, UNIP members were 
encouraged (through the extension of credit) to buy large farms and many entered into 
commercial production. However, ‘UNIP’ farmers were not generally the most experienced 
or productive. Second, price controls on maize and cotton limited the incentives to expand 
production or introduce more productive farming techniques.  Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, the most productive farmers in the country were outside the core constituency of 
UNIP and were therefore not favoured in terms of credit, pricing policy or foreign exchange 
allocation. White settler farmers dominated agricultural production, and in particular maize 
production, in the colonial era, while the political power of large-scale white settler farmers 
waned with the nationalist struggle for independence. The rise of African farmers in the post-
colonial period took place mostly around the ‘line of rail’ in the Southern and Central 
Province.  These groups were not politically powerful, principally because they backed the 
main rival to UNIP in the First Republic: the ANC party. They stood outside the ruling 
coalition at independence and through the one-party state of the Second Republic. 
Nevertheless, these farmers were the most productive maize producers as the Southern and 
Central Province had the most fertile soil and was the least costly to market since many of the 
large-scale farms were near rail and road transport. Thus the most productive farmers were 
politically associated with either colonialism or rival parties and thus were not favoured. 
 
Eighteen years of UNIP rule, while producing political order, was dramatically impoverishing 
for a once relatively wealthy and promising economy. Challenges to state authority were on 
the rise, albeit belatedly, by the late 1980s. Here the role of labour unions proved central in 
providing an organisational focal point that limited the extent to which increasingly 
dysfunctional patronage patters could continue. It is precisely the partially corporatist 
relationship with UNIP (discussed above) that made labour unions a pivotal group in the 
polity. Labour unions were the main powerful urban group that was not completely 
subservient to UNIP. In the face of worsening economic decline, the labour unions were to 
prove central as a focal point of opposition to UNIP in the late 1980s and early 1990. Given 
their semi-autonomous power, labour unions can be seen to play the role of ‘third party 
enforcer’ in the sense that they could provide a check to the ability to UNIP to maintain 
power regardless of the effectiveness of economic policy which, to repeat, was abysmal 
through the 1980s.  
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Centralised patronage within the rise and fall of multi-party politics: the Third Republic 
(1991-2010) 
Protracted economic decline brought an end to UNIP power in 1991. This section attempts to 
examine why the downfall of the country’s foundational party and the introduction of multi-
party democracy did not lead to an unravelling of long-standing political stability, as it has 
done in many less developed countries (see Snyder 2000; Paris 2004). Not only that, the 
system of centralised patronage was sustained, albeit with a more fragile organisational base. 
 
The ZCTU trade union leadership led the movement demanding institutional change, and in 
particular the return to multiparty democracy. This is consistent with the argument that labour 
unions were a pivotal political force in the Zambian polity up until this time.  Labour unions 
had become increasingly angry with the government’s unwillingness to grant them full 
autonomy, even though they were not completely under UNIP control (Baylies and Szeftel 
1992). In late December 1989 ZCTU Chairman Frederick Chiluba led this challenge and 
became head of an opposition political party, called the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD), which formally registered as party in 1991.26  
 
Although Kaunda was against a return to multi-party politics, he eventually agreed to enter 
into negotiations with the MMD to allow for this possibility. Kaunda and UNIP offered a 
referendum on the issue. However, the referendum campaign was overshadowed by violent 
riots that occurred in the wake of the government decision to double the price of rice − 
required by the IMF. The economy was bankrupt and there was little policy space available to 
the government. The riots killed 27 people.  Unlike the maize riots of 1987, this time the 
clamour was not only about the restoration of food prices but for the resignation of Kaunda 
and the UNIP from government over its handling of the economic system (Erdmann and 
Simutanyi 2003). 
 
Following large pro-democracy rallies staged by the MMD in September, 1990, Kaunda 
decided to abandon the referendum and recommend changing the constitution. These 
developments are strongly evocative of Kaunda’s reflection some years before that ‘any 
ruling power which is wise enough to make sufficient concessions to vindicate non-violent 
opposition, would probably be wise enough in the first place to read the signs of the times and 
change things‘ (cited in Burnell 2005). In the end, the two leaders reached a ‘pact’ that 
allowed for elections and constitutional changes. The negotiations were mediated by church 
leaders, students and labour union leaders. This was central to achieving a non-violent 
transition of power. As in many other contexts, political pacts, particularly among elites, have 
been instrumental to the prospects of preventing regime collapse and political violence 
(Dogan and Higley 1998).    
 
A second factor that contributed to the maintenance of political order was the construction of 
an organised political alternative to an increasingly dysfunctional political system. The MMD, 
although it had much less organisational reach than UNIP, provided a focal point for the 
many disgruntled groups in the electorate to coalesce,  thus  making a smooth political 
transition possible and a change of government in the ensuing elections that much more likely 
(Burnell 2005).27 As it turned out, Chiluba and the MMD won an overwhelming victory in 
                                                 
26 Levy Mwanawasa became Vice-President of MMD, and was to later succeed Chiluba as President of Zambia 
in 2001. 
27 Support for the MMD was strong among intellectuals, labour unions, private business, the church, the urban 
poor and unemployed (Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 84). 
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1991. Chiluba received 75 percent of the vote to Kaunda’s 25 percent. The MMD took control 
of 125 of the 150 seats in parliament and UNIP’s parliamentary share was reduced to 19 seats 
(Rakner 2003). 
 
There were several other factors, however, that permitted the continuation of centralised 
patronage and a dominant executive power. The first was a significant continuity in the elites 
who were included in the cabinet and in what emerged as the MMD power base.28 As Baylies 
and Szeftel (1992: 83) note:  
‘What most distinguished MMD from UNIP electoral candidates was less their 
age, education, and experience, than their anger with UNIP and its policies. No 
fewer than 20 MMD candidates in the 1991 elections were former or sitting UNIP 
MPs and 12 had been cabinet ministers or central committee members of UNIP. 
Another six had been UNIP regional secretaries or district governors and four 
were former army officers.‘  
 
Moreover, among the MMD candidates who stood for election in 1991, at least one third (and 
the number is likely to be far higher) had significant business interests, legal practices or both, 
and a number were prominent members of the Zambian bourgeoisie (Baylies and Szeftel 
1992: 84).  As was shown in the last section, most elites emerged previously through being 
part of the UNIP patronage system. In fact, the business sector, long quiet in political 
campaigns, provided major financial support for Chiluba (Rakner 2003).  
 
The second notable historical continuity was the rapid construction of a dominant political 
party, which prevented the real danger of a fragmentation (or ‘balkanisation’) of the state and 
of the patronage structure. The rapid decline of UNIP was not immediately replaced by any 
other national political party. Again, Baylies and Szeftel (1992: 89-90) note: 
‘The accession to office a new party did not transform Zambia’s political structure 
or culture. The size of Chiluba’s victory left only a small UNIP rump in the 
parliament making multi-party competition weak. In this sense, MMD was in a 
similar position to UNIP in 1964.  The constitution did not change the balance of 
power between the executive and the parliament, which remained weak. Power 
and patronage remained centralised in the Presidency and the executive more 
generally. The strategy of balancing claimants to cabinet posts on regional lines 
continued as in the Second Republic.‘  
While there has been a proliferation of parties in the Third Republic, most are either ‘one-
issue’ parties or are centred on one ethnic group or region (Posner 2005; Erdmann and 
Simutanyi 2003). 
 
The Chiluba government made political moves to increase the power of the executive by 
rejecting almost all recommendations of constitutional change previously agreed upon with 
Kaunda prior to the 1991 elections.29 Many of these changes would have made governance – 
                                                 
28 The available evidence indicates that Chiluba retained the convention of balanced appointments across ethnic 
and regional elites, evident in the largely broad-based outlook of his administration between 1991 and 2001 
(Lindeman 2009). 
29 The executive’s already large discretionary financial powers were further increased with the introduction of a 
‘Presidential Discretionary Fund’ in 1998, which allowed the President to spend a part of the budget according 
to his own priorities and without substantial parliamentary control.The unabated ‘centralism’ of the MMD 
administration became also obvious in the centre’s enduring control over local government. Financially, the 
local authorities not only suffered from a dramatic decline in central government grants from 34% in 1987 to 
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but also some other institutions of state, such as the judiciary and the electoral commission – 
more independent from the presidency and more accountable to parliament. The amended 
constitution of 1996 left the presidential system with its extensive powers virtually 
unchanged.30  There was substantial opposition from former UNIP leaders, including Kaunda, 
who opposed these moves (UNIP boycotted the 1996 elections, which Chiluba also won with 
a comfortable majority) as well as a coup attempt in 1997.  The Chiluba government was 
swift and harsh in its response. The level of government crackdown increased significantly to 
the point that Kaunda and other leader were held without trial, and media censorship and 
harassment increased significantly (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). 
 
A third factor that facilitated the continuity of centralised patronage and dominant party rule 
was the growing fragmentation and weakness of political parties and interest groups. Rakner 
(2003) documents the growing weakness of interest groups in influencing the content of 
economic policy-making in the period 1991-2001. There were several processes that caused 
this. 
 
The first concerns economic policy and the nature of economic decline. The Chiluba regime 
announced its intention to liberalise the economy. Although most of these policies were 
introduced more slowly than intended (more on this below), there was, over the course of 
early 1990s, substantial trade liberalisation and privatisation (see Rakner 2003 for details). 
The immediate effects of economic reforms was that business, labour and agricultural 
associations experienced a decline in income and membership because of increasing levels of 
redundancies, bankruptcies, and the high cost of living due to spiralling inflation (Rakner 
2003: 16). Higher levels of unemployment weakened trade-union membership in particular. 
In addition, the de-industrialisation that accompanied trade liberalisation led to substantial de-
urbanisation as the unemployed, particularly in the Copperbelt, but also in Lusaka, moved to 
nearby lands around towns and cities (Potts 2005). This reduced both labour-union numbers 
as well as providing an ‘exit’ option for a potentially angry mob of unemployed who could 
very easily have been mobilised by an opportunistic political party.31 Moreover, while 
economic liberalisation had not benefited smallholders much, this producer group is too 
dispersed to form a unified opposition.  
 
The second main reason has to do with the historical nature of interest-group formation. 
Under UNIP dominance, there was very little or no space for autonomous interest groups like 
business chambers or alternative political parties to develop. The fact that UNIP declined so 
rapidly in influence, meant that there was little time for business groups and political parties 
to develop into effective national organisations.  
 
The one exception is the national labour union, which has declined significantly in 
membership as result of de-industrialisation. Liberalisation and privatisation policies have 
clearly hurt workers significantly, particularly in Lusaka and the Copperbelt. In fact, as a 
consequence of the deteriorating living conditions there were numerous strikes by public 
                                                                                                                                                        
3.4% in 1997 but were also deprived of many former powers to mobilise resources (e.g. beer surtax, motor 
vehicle licensing, rent from council housing). The complete disregard for local autonomy became apparent in 
2000 when Chiluba installed ‘district administrators’ as political appointees that were responsible to the 
president and financially well-equipped for patronage purposes (Lindemann 2009). 
30 Erdman and Simutanyi (2003) note also that there were significant levels of human rights abuses. 
31 More research is needed as to why this exit option was so widespread, as this has rarely occurred voluntarily, 
even in economies undergoing economic crisis.  The provision of infrastructure or government incentives are not 
likely to be  part of the answer 
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service employees and other workers. Since 1993 there have been major strikes by various 
civil service groups every year, some lasting for a couple of months (Erdmann and Simutanyi 
2003: 65).  But none of the strikes turned political against the MMD government. Erdmann 
and Simutanyi explain the quiescence of the ruling party on the fact that it had maintained its 
stronghold in the Copperbelt – the main area of the trade-union strength − because Chiluba 
and the MMD for a long time continued to be viewed in the Copperbelt as being one of 
‘theirs’. More research is needed to assess the validity of this claim. 
 
While MMD dominance became more contested in the Mwanawasa administrations (2001-
2008), the general patterns of rule highlighted have persisted to this day. However, it is 
important to note that there have been some important changes in the elite bargain and the 
structure of patronage that may generate greater fragility in the polity.   
 
One main change has been a growing factionalism within MMD (along factions allied to 
Chiluba and Mwanawasa) and with it the growing use of corruption scandals as a tool of 
political competition. The origin of this factionalism is owed in part to the manner in which 
Mwanawasa sought to increase his legitimacy from a weak base in 2001. Initially seen as the 
chosen and loyal successor of his benefactor, Chiluba, President Mwanawasa came to power 
with a weak electoral mandate (29 percent in the 2001 elections) and lacking a constituency 
of support within his own party. Thus he spent considerable time trying to win legitimacy 
within the country and in his party. Apart from benefiting from rising copper prices and FDI, 
Mwanawasa focused energy on an anti-corruption drive which targeted his predecessor. This 
re-enforced the split between the Mwanawasa and Chiluba factions (the latter being more tied 
with old UNIP elites) within MMD.  A second change was in the political role of rent 
allocation. Instead of using rents to buy group loyalty in the mould of Kaunda, beneficiaries 
were less ‘representatives‘ of their groups than individual entrepreneurs (Levy and Palale 
2007). One of the main reasons for this shift is that economic liberalisation has reduced the 
ability of the state to control resource allocation and thus has reduced the resources available 
to deploy resources to wider constituencies.  The more overtly personalist deployment of 
patronage has been on of the main reasons why corruption scandals have been more salient in 
the post-1991 period.32  Third, economic liberalisation has increased the proportion of 
economic elites outside the ruling party.  This includes foreign mining companies, but also 
white settler farmers along the ‘line of rail’ who have benefited from economic liberalisation 
in agriculture. 
 
Following Mwanawasa’s death on 29 June 2008, a behind-the-scenes succession battle raged 
within the MMD. Internal fighting in part derived from Mwanawasa’s failure to specify a 
chosen successor. The main battle was between acting President Rupiah Banda and Finance 
Minister Ngandu Magande, who presided over the successful completion of debt relief under 
the HIPC programme. Against the early predictions of many commentators, Banda was 
ultimately chosen to be the party’s presidential candidate by 47 votes to Magande’s 11.. 
Banda was able to use his position as acting President during Mwanawasa’s lengthy illness, 
along with the support of his wealthy backers, to construct a patronage network in preparation 
for the inevitable succession battle. At the same time, he had a clear advantage over his 
competitors because, as acting leader, he enjoyed a monopoly over the main media sources. 
The second key factor underpinning his victory was the recognition of senior MMD ‘king 
makers’, many of whom had had worked together in the UNIP during the one-party state era, 
                                                 
32 Consistent with this is the Afrobarometer Survey 2010 which indicates that in 2003, 73% of those surveyed 
thought government policies ‘have hurt most people and benefited a few’; by 2009, this ratio reaches 81% of 
those surveyed.  
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that Banda was a figure from a similar political generation with whom they could do business 
(Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010). 
 
Banda won a tightly contested election in 2008. He received 40.1 percent of the votes 
compared to Micheal Sata, leader of the main opposition, the Patriotic Front (PF), who 
received 38.1 percent. Sata’s base was strong among the Bemba, but also among working 
class groups throughout the country who felt they were not benefiting from MMD economic 
policies. Most interesting is that Sata’s strong performance derived from the ability of the PF 
to mobilise a similar number of votes in 2008 as compared to 2006, while support for the 
MMD fell by over 450,000, reflecting the lack of popular enthusiasm for Banda’s candidacy 
(Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010). 
 
The election of Rupiah Banda as president in 2008 has shifted the power balance within 
MMD toward the Chiluba faction. Evidence of this is that corruption charges against Chiluba 
were suddenly dropped after years of investigation. However, there is little to indicate that the 
more precarious nature of the elite bargain and the patronage system mentioned above has 
changed in any substantive way. Moreover, there has been a noticeable decline in the 
institutional and organisational capacity of political parties (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010).  
This is partly the result of the lack of funding available to opposition parties and the growing 
factionalism within MMD. 
 
Apart from the changing nature of politics, which has potentially made political stability more 
fragile, there are important obstacles to economic growth and development that may re-
enforce this fragility. It is true that growth has revived since 1998 (see Table 4). However, 
there are several factors that are cause for concern. First, there is little evidence that the 
current increase in growth can be sustained in the absence of continued buoyancy of mining-
sector exports. More worrying is that, even in spite of the this boom, growth rates in 
agriculture and manufacturing are well below the growth rates in more successful countries in 
the region such as Mozambique and Uganda, where growth in manufacturing is not sustained 
by high mineral prices.  The dominance of mining over the economy in the past was part of 
the process that resulted in long term decline and massive indebtedness, both internal and 
external. The strong appreciation of the exchange rate in recent years has also hurt the 
competitiveness of the tourism industry, and many domestic firms in manufacturing complain 
that they are having trouble competing with imports from neighbouring countries (Cali and Te 
Welde 2007). As important, high local transport costs (due to the high price of fuel and 
woefully poor infrastructure) inhibit economic diversification and growth, which is essential 
for employment creation and poverty reduction. 
 
Table 4: Growth in Zambia: 1990-2008 
Source: Bank of Zambia 
 
 GDP Agriculture Manufacturing 
1990-1998 -0.5 0.5 1.5
1999-2002 3.5 2.5 4.0
2003-2008 5.7 2.8 4.1
 
Second, despite this renewed growth, the government has not benefited from this in terms of 
tax revenues, which have not increased. Taxes as a percentage of GDP in fact declined from 
18.4 percent in 1996 to 17.0 percent in 2005. One of the main reasons is the very low royalty 
the Zambian government set to attract copper-mining investment. The royalty of 0.6 percent 
 36
is one of the lowest mining-royalty taxes in the world, and even the IMF has suggested that 
the government consider re-negotiating the royalty rate of 3.0 percent. In 2006, the 
government received just $25 million in copper royalties out of a $US 2 billion turnover in 
copper sales.  Over the longer period 2000-2008, mining companies effectively paid no 
income tax.33 The other main reason is that the state equity share in the development 
agreements with copper companies was set between 10 and 15 percent (compared with Chile, 
for example, where the state share is 50 percent). This substantially hampers the extent to 
which the government can finance improvements in physical infrastructure, which are 
essential for reviving productive capacity and growth in non-copper sectors in agriculture and 
light manufacturing. 
 
Third, there is still very little support for a development strategy based on economic 
liberalisation and foreign direct investment. There are several reasons for this: a) the 
perceived raw deal the state has bargained with foreign copper firms (as just mentioned); b) 
the failure of structural adjustment programmes to revive investment and growth in the 1990s; 
and c) the fact that most of the large farms on the ‘line of rail who have benefited from 
economic liberalisation have been white settler farmers and foreign firms (though a few large 
Zambian firms such as Zambeef have benefited as well). All of these factors have generated a 
sense that old colonial patterns of exploitation are re-emerging with the move toward 
economic liberalisation. 
 
The lack of popular support for the broad strategy of economic liberalisation can be seen in a 
recent survey on Zambia by Afrobarometer (2010): a)  78 percent of the population agrees 
with the idea that ‘the government should retain its ownership of its factories, businesses and 
farms’; b) 59 percent of the population believe ‘government control of agricultural marketing’ 
is better than private trading; and c) 70 percent of the population believe all civil servants 
should retain their jobs even if paying their salaries is costly.34  While one could debate the 
merits of these views, the reality is that the dominant economic strategy does not seem to 
have substantial support among the population, and this is a potential cause of political unrest.  
In many ways, the evolution of the Third Republic has brought about a political pattern that 
resembles that of the First Republic. In both periods, the ruling parties started out with largely 
‘national’ appeal that was especially strong, at least initially, among Bemba-speakers on the 
Copperbelt and in Northern and Luapula provinces (Lindemann 2009).  The main opposition 
parties – ANC and UP during the First Republic and NP and UNPD during the Third 
Republic – had their organisational and electoral strength among the Lozi- and Tonga-
speaking groups of Western and Southern provinces.  What is perhaps more worrying the 
growing de-institutionalisation of the political parties, which has its roots in the growing 
factionalism along regional and ethnic lines since the early 2000s (Cheeeseman and 
Hinflelaar 2010). If this leads to the fragmentation of patronage patterns, then the durability 
                                                 
33 It  is important to note that the very investment-friendly deal in the copper privatisation − a reduction in the 
corporate tax rate from 35 to 25%; exemption from customs duty on inputs up to US$15 million; reduction of the 
mineral royalty from 2.0% to 0.6%; exoneration from excise duty on electricity; an increase in the period for 
which losses could be carried, from 10 to 20 years; and exemption from the withholding tax on interest, 
dividends, royalties and management fees (Fraser and Lungu 2007) − was the result of the desperate situation in 
the copper industry. In 1999, it was estimated that the state copper mines were losing US$1 million per day; 
while the economy faced macroeconomic crises of hyperinflation, and one of the highest per capita debts in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The international financial institutions made privatisation of the copper industry a requirement 
for structural adjustment loans. 
34 It is worth noting that public wages comprise 8.1% of GDP, one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF 
2010). The very high public employment level in Zambia has indeed been one of the main mechanisms of 
maintaining political patronage since the liberalisation period. 
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of the elite bargain may be called into question, which in turn could undermine political 
stability and state resilience. 
 
Main Lessons from the Zambian Case 
The Zambian case highlights several important lessons for understanding economic and 
political strategies that can prevent violent conflict and thus contribute to a resilient state.  
 
First, the construction of national political parties is central to the institutionalisation of 
centralised patronage and can reduce the possibility of political contests around more narrow 
regional or ethnic lines.  This is consistent with recent econometric evidence that the main 
factor responsible for reducing conflict is the extent to which political organisations are 
cohesive (Gladstone et al. 2010). 
 
Second, a political leader with more than one regional affiliation, as in the case of Kaunda, 
can provide a more broad-based following than leaders whose identity can be more narrowly 
focused.  While Kaunda’s background of having roots in more than one region was fortuitous, 
it suggests that ruling coalitions need to cut across potential cleavages to reduce the likelihood 
of violent conflict. 
 
Third, the construction of an inclusive elite bargain is central to reducing the prospects of 
rebellion.  In practice, this means that the central government needs to be given the space by 
donors to develop patronage structures that accommodate competing elite claims to state 
resources. 
 
Fourth, the institution of one-party rule can prevent the emergence of regional and ethnic 
violence when party patronage is accompanied by an inclusive elite bargain. Multi-party 
electoral competition in Zambia has been associated with greater political instability. 
 
Fifth, transitions of power are facilitated when many of the ‘old guard’ elites are incorporated 
into an emerging and increasingly dominant political organisation.  The transition from UNIP 
to MMD was peaceful in large part because of this factor. 
 
Sixth, the existence of a pivotal interest group that has political ties with established and 
emerging political parties can provide a focal point for elites to switch party affiliation. 
Labour unions played that role in Zambia in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Seventh, the costs of conflict prevention in Zambia were substantial.  The elite bargain and 
accommodating urban consumers with low food prices led to a series of economic policies 
that were based on the deployment of subsidies and access to valuable rights based more on 
political rather than economic criteria.  While marketing boards, for example, were central to 
party and state control over the countryside and were instrumental in expanding the territorial 
reach of the state, the resulting loss in economic production and productivity was high. In a 
larger sense, the Zambian case suggests that state capacities across functions are clearly not 
monolithic. 
 
To get a rough (and indeed conservative) indication of the costs of conflict prevention, one 
could examine the lost revenues from the copper industry as a result of the complete 
nationalisation of the industry. Before 1972, the state had a 51 percent share of the industry 
and contracted out the management of the industry to experienced foreign firms. The 
management of the industry was generally effective up to this point (Sardanis 2003). Given 
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the pressure to nationalise the industry from high-level UNIP elites, Kaunda decided to 
terminate all of the management contracts in 1973 and placed the entire industry in the state 
where there was a severe lack of management experience. Moreover, copper proceeds were 
then used to fund non-copper businesses as a mechanism to widen patronage to elites as 
described in the paper. This policy starved the copper industry of resources to maintain 
competitiveness. 
 
The economic consequences of this decision were very costly. Exports declined from 622,900 
metric tonnes in 1972 to 228,000 on the eve of privatisation in 1999. In order to get a rough 
idea of the costs incurred, assume that the pre-1972 arrangement would have at least 
maintained production, and then compare this to the annual average copper production over 
the period 1985-1999, which was 400,000 tons/year. Since the average yearly price for copper 
over the period was $2,000/ton, the average annual revenue loss may have been 
approximately US$46 million per year (230,000 tons multiplied by $2,000/ton). Over fifteen 
years, this amounts to US$ 690 million. This is a conservative estimate of the loss since a 
viable copper industry in Zambia would likely have increased production beyond its peak of 
622,900 tons in 1972. 
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Appendix:  The Decline of Zambian Economic Performance 
Upon independence in October 1964, the new government of Zambia faced a daunting task. 
Popular expectations were high, fuelled by nationalist enthusiasm and the pledge by the 
government to correct the glaring imbalances and inequities created by colonial rule. In the 
1960s, Zambia was a middle-income country believed to have considerable growth potential.  
In the mid-1960s, no place was emerging faster than Zambia, the newly independent nation 
that was previously part of a wider colonial federation under British rule.  From being a 
purely agricultural territory at the time of takeover by British mining interests in the 1890s, 
the modern state of Zambia had by 1969 arrived as the most urbanised country in Africa. 
Zambia had scores of cities with over 100,000 inhabitants and these cities contained 40 
percent of the population (Ferguson 1999). Mineworkers in the leading sector, copper, were 
among the best paid workers in all of Africa. Copper dominated the economy at 
independence, and would do so for thirty years despite attempts through government planning 
and later ‘market forces’ to diversify. 
 
The first policy regime began after Zambia gained independence in 1964. The newly-
established government opted for what was essentially a market economy.35 However, mining 
and urban areas were favoured through import substitution financed by growing copper 
exports. As a result of foreign investment in mining, GDP rose rapidly at 5.1 percent per year 
during 1964-72. Few people benefited from this growth, however, particularly in rural areas. 
Accordingly, inequality, which was already high prior to independence, worsened over this 
decade. Indeed, income distribution was to remain very unequal throughout the period 1970-
2000. In the 1990s, Zambia was one of the most unequal societies in Sub-Saharan Africa as 
measured by income variation.  The Gini coefficient falls into the .50 to .60 range, which 
places Zambia with South Africa, Namibia and Botswana as the most unequal in the sub-
Saharan region, and also close to Brazil and Colombia (Weeks et. al, 2004: 64). 
 
In the early 1970s the government broke from its market-driven policies, opting rather for 
state-control. An urban bias was entrenched in 1972 when the copper mines were nationalised 
as part of the newly-adopted strategy based on the establishment and expansion of state-
owned enterprises. Copper revenues were used to subsidise generally inefficient import-
substituting industrialisation and provide low-cost food to urban consumers (Bates and Collier 
1993).  Both large-scale and small-scale farmers were forced to sell crops − and particularly 
the staple crop, maize − to the state marketing board (NAMBOARD) at well below 
international prices (Pletcher 2000).  The fast growth of the late 1960s ended when world 
copper prices fell sharply in the early 1970s. Export earnings were eroded, placing 
considerable pressure on the current account. The government, believing this negative terms-
of-trade shock to be temporary, borrowed heavily to lessen the sharp decline in imported 
consumer and investment goods. Foreign debt mounted rapidly while GDP growth dropped to 
0.5 percent. Rather than initiate a process of structural adjustment and encourage 
diversification, the government chose to adopt regulatory policies. Subsidies and fixed 
consumer prices protected urban consumption, while the mining sector and state-owned 
manufacturing were favoured through import-licensing and foreign exchange allocation. 
Growth remained unresponsive to this new interventionist strategy. In 1978, the government 
acknowledged the failure of its policies and implemented the country’s first structural 
adjustment program (SAP). Despite improved macroeconomic stability, political will was 
undermined and the reform process remained half-hearted. By the mid-1980s subsidies 
                                                 
35 This section draws substantially on reviews of economic policy by Bates and Collier (1993); Weeks et al. 
(2004); and Thurlow and Wobst (2004). 
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comprised 20 percent of the fiscal budget, while price controls made many state enterprises 
unprofitable and in need of cross-subsidisation.  
 
Zambia entered a period of economic transition in the mid-1980s when the government 
attempted a second SAP aimed at correcting price distortions. However, while the program 
recognised the need for diversification (including into agriculture), it was again conditioned 
on the support of the ruling elite. When unrest in the urbanised Copperbelt province 
threatened mining revenues, which represented the government’s main source of income and 
political support, the government bowed to political and economic pressures by backtracking 
on reforms. A new set of interventions were announced, signalling a partial return to a 
command-style economy. Following some positive growth during the mid-1980s the 
economy entered a recession in 1989. Consequently, a third SAP was negotiated in which 
prices were decontrolled for all goods except maize and fertiliser. Although the program was 
far-reaching, it failed to achieve its objectives when the government again backtracked on 
reforms in order to win urban support in the run-up to the 1991 elections. Maize and fertiliser 
reforms were halted, and the money supply was expanded to cover civil service wage-
increases. Many donors withdrew support due to the government’s lack of commitment to 
economic reform. 
 
In 1991, after 27 years of one-party rule under President Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the 
United Independence Party (UNIP), Frederick Chiluba, a trade union leader and head of the 
emerging opposition party, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), won the country’s 
first free elections in 1991 based on a commitment to comprehensive structural adjustment 
and the promise of more transparent and accountable governance.
 
However the government 
inherited an unstable and contracting economy with high poverty and inequality, a collapsing 
copper-dominated export sector and massive foreign debt. The fourth SAP, which began 
immediately after the new government was elected, encompassed macroeconomic 
stabilisation, public sector reform, external liberalisation, the privatisation of state assets and 
agricultural reforms.36  
 
Inflation, which had soared during the final years of the post-independence government, 
averaged 127 percent in the period 1990-93. The exchange rate was depreciating equally 
rapidly, while real interest rates were large and negative. The government attempted to 
establish macroeconomic stability and by 1995 inflation had levelled at around 25 percent, a 
rate that would be maintained into the next decade. However, despite a more stable 
macroeconomic environment, sustained investment growth failed to materialise until after 
1998. The positive overall investment growth for 1991-98 hides considerable variation caused 
by political and economic uncertainty. 
 
In 2002, following four consecutive years of positive 
growth, the economy reached a level of real investment last achieved in the mid-1980s. 
Despite the successfully implemented reforms of the 1990s, full macroeconomic stability has 
remained elusive. 
 
The government introduced a ‘cash budget system’ in 1993 as part of public sector reform. 
This limited the government to financing current expenditure out of existing revenues. 
                                                 
36 Although these reforms hoped to stimulate growth and diversify the economy, GDP growth remained stagnant 
at 0.2% throughout the 1990s. Between 1975 and 1986, Zambia was forced by the IMF to attempt 
(unsuccessfully) seven different stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes. Almost without exception, 
these produced contraction, inflation and unemployment. A series of devaluations coincided with growing 
inflation. 
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Although countering past tendencies towards deficit-financing and inflationary monetary 
expansion, the government’s compliance to the new system has been somewhat mixed. While 
revenue-raising policy changes have been largely unsuccessful, the government’s expenditure 
cuts have been substantial. However, the government failed to overcome its political 
dependence on urban public sector workers. Rather than reducing the burden of the civil 
service, the government chose to reduce public investment and social spending. Social 
spending in particular had been declining throughout the previous two decades leading to 
deteriorating infant and adult mortality, and a strong urban bias in education spending. This 
downward trend continued into the 1990s.  
 
External liberalisation was achieved through extensive rationalisation and lowering of trade 
protection. By 1996 the government removed all quantitative restrictions and licenses, and 
reduced the number of applied tariff rates. This made Zambia one of the most open 
economies in Africa, and stands in stark contrast to earlier import-substitution 
industrialisation. A large increase in imports was prevented by the continued depreciation of 
the exchange rate, which encouraged real export growth. However, inefficient state-owned 
enterprises did not respond positively to the removal of protection, and formal manufacturing 
employment fell rapidly. 
 
Falling formal employment also resulted from the privatisation of state assets. In 1990, over 
three-quarters of formal GDP was generated by state-owned enterprises.  Initially the 
privatisation process was slow due to political opposition, but increased donor pressure 
accelerated the process. By 1997 over 80 percent of state enterprises had either been dissolved 
or sold to the private sector. The sale of the main copper-mining assets was delayed until 
mounting donor pressure forced the government to announce its sale in 1996. Despite a long 
and expensive tendering process, a potential buyer was identified in 2000. However, world 
copper prices fell 50 percent during this interim period, thereby jeopardising the sale and 
threatening a collapse of the sector. Donor support and improvements in copper prices have 
subsequently kept the mines operating, but these recent developments suggest that the role of 
copper as a source of foreign earnings is uncertain and limited.  
 
One of the key components of the 1991 reform package has been the liberalisation of 
agricultural markets. The previous government favoured maize production through pan-
territorial pricing, input and output marketing assistance and food subsidies in urban areas. In 
1991, the new government attempted to eliminate food subsidies and reduce state 
involvement in the maize and fertiliser sectors. Resulting food-price increases were met with 
considerable opposition in urban areas. Starting in 1992 the country suffered from a series of 
severe droughts, which eventually halted the reform process and caused the government to re-
enter the market. Despite these setbacks the reforms were completed by 1995. 
 
The structural adjustment programme brought profound changes to a country ill structured to 
accommodate them.  Trade liberalisation introduced competition, which the state enterprises 
were unprepared to meet.37  The liberalised economic environment, when combined with 
extremely high borrowing rates, proved in practice to be biased against Zambian producers.  
The harsh environment was compounded by uncertainties in the business environment arising 
from unstable macroeconomic conditions and unpredictable changes in the implementation of 
the economic policy instruments.  High prices for utilities such as electricity, water, 
telephones and fuel further worsened the difficulties faced by domestic industries. 
                                                 
37 The average effective rate of protection declined from 110.2% in 1993 to 26.3% by 1996 (Mwanawina and 
Mulungushi 2002: 22, Table 6). 
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By any conceivable measure, the growth performance of Zambia has been poor (Table A1).  
 
Table A1: Zambia’s Per Capita Growth Rates in Comparative Perspective 1961-1990 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
 
Country 1961-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-2000 
Zambia .7 .8 .5 -4.0 -2.2 -.8 -2.7 -.2
Sub-Sahara 
African 
Average 
2.2 1.5 3.3 .9 -.5 .5 -1.4 2.0
Zambia ‘s 
rank: 16/26 20/31 22/32 30/32 29/36 26/40 32/41 34/41
 
During these decades of economic decline, the production structure of the economy 
underwent considerable change, primarily as a result of the absolute and relative decline of 
mining in the 1990s rather than the growth of other sectors (see Figure A1).   
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Figure A1: Sectoral Shares in Aggregate Value Added, 1965-2004 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
. 
Up to the early 1990s, despite low growth rates, there was a tendency for the productive 
sectors to increase relatively, with a slight upward trend in mining, manufacturing and 
agriculture, though the regional drought in the early 1990s resulted in a brief, severe drop in 
the latter.  After the early 1990s, mining began a rapid decline, from above 20 percent of 
aggregate value added in 1991 to well below 10 percent at the end of the decade.  Over the 
same years, the manufacturing share stagnated and agriculture declined, implying by 
definition an increase in the residual category ‘services’.  Since the share of value added in 
the public sector declined or did not increase over these years, it follows that redundant 
workers fell into low-remuneration ‘informal’ activities.  Thus, the structural change one 
observes is that of an economy in decline, with households increasingly struggling to subsist 
in activities of low productivity. 
 
As the Zambian economy declined and foreign exchange from copper declined, pressure 
increased on the balance of payments.  Figure A2 shows imports and exports as a share of 
GDP from the early 1990s to 2004.  After an approximate balance between the two in the 
early 1990s, the trade gap widened sharply to reach 10 percent of GDP in 2000, and remain at 
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an unsustainable level.  The trade gap was covered by growing indebtedness, primarily to 
multilateral lenders. 
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Figure A2: Exports and Imports as Percent of GDP, 1992-2004 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
 
The unsustainable trade and current account deficit resulted in a loss of control of the nominal 
exchange rate.  After relative exchange rate stability from independence to the mid-1980s, the 
exchange rate collapsed in the late 1980s, and collapsed even more in the early to mid 1990s.  
This collapse generated rampant inflation, which approached hyper-inflation levels during 
1990-1995.  
 
Thus, the instability of the Zambian economy followed a clear sequence of causality: the 
decline of foreign exchange earnings from copper, severe balance of payments pressure and 
collapse of the exchange rate, resulting in uncontrollable inflation (Figure A3). 
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Figure A3: Zambia:  Changes in the Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate & Inflation, 1960-2004 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
Note:  The exchange rate was fixed at .71 (local currency) to the US dollar during 1960-1972, and for 1973-75 at 
.64. 
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Weeks et al. (2004) argue that the most surprising aspect of this process was that the 
apparently large inflows of multilateral loans in the first half of the 1990s did not dampen the 
inflation, but were coincident with it approaching hyper level.  During the high inflation of 
the 1990s, net grants and loans were a negative 4 to 6 percent of GDP. ODA funds entered the 
Central Bank, to flow out immediately to pay external debt to the lending agencies making 
those loans (see Weeks and McKinley 2006). 
 
Under IMF conditionality, however, it should be noted that the government, under Chiluba’s 
successor, Levy Mwanawasa (also from MMD) who won the presidency in 2001, has 
substantially reduced inflation through the implementation of a tight monetary, policy. It is 
also important to note that severe balance of payments constraints have increased the leverage 
that the IMF and World Bank have had over policy in the post-1998 period (Weeks and 
McKinley 2006). This is reflected in the growing role that foreign aid plays in financing 
investment in Zambia (Table A2). 
 
Table A2: Zambia: Resource Availability and Investment as a Percentage of GDP in 
Comparative Perspective 
Source: World Bank Indicators 
 
 Gross capital formation 
Gross 
National 
Savings 
ODA Grants Foreign Direct Investment 
Zambia   
1980-85 17.9 12.8 2.1 0.6 
1990-95 13.1 7.4 14.0 4.4 
1999-2004 21.4 12.9 11.0 3.0 
   
LDC 
Average   
1980-85 16.8 3.4 4.9 0.4 
1990-95 16.8 5.3 9.4 0.7 
1999-2004 20.6 7.2 11.0 3.3 
 
 
Such an increase in aid (which has included substantial debt relief under the HIPC initiative), 
while it may have limited the policy space of the government, has contributed to 
macroeconomic stabilisation. 
 
In relative terms, the debt burden the Zambian economy faced since 1985 is one of the worst 
in sub-Saharan Africa. This severely limited the space politicians had not only in distributing 
political patronage but also in maintaining social service provision to the wider population. 
Zambia’s onerous debt burden arose through a combination of unsound lending policies on 
the part of multilateral agencies, which had the active support of bilateral donors, over 
optimism on the part of the government to repay large debts, and declines in the terms of 
trade (Weeks et al. 2004).  Figure A4 indicates the share of debt service in exports during 
1975-2001. 
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Figure A4: Zambia’s Debt Service as a Percentage of Exports and Number of Sub-Saharan 
Countries with Higher Ratios, 1975-2001 (3 year moving average) 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
 
It is important to point out that an external debt must be re-paid, as opposed to merely 
refinanced, through foreign exchange earnings.  Therefore, the capacity to pay will be 
affected by the price of exports, which determine the purchasing power of those exports, and 
import prices, which affect the cost of producing those exports. Weeks et. al. (2004) show 
that, when per capita debt is adjusted by the net barter terms of trade (Figure A5), the result is 
quite different from that seen in Figure A4.  
 
 
 
Figure A5: Debt Per capita, Current US dollars Adjusted for the Terms of Trade, 1980-2001 (3 
year moving average) 
Source: Weeks et al. 2004. 
 
In 2000-2001, the terms of trade adjusted per capita debt stood 50 percent higher than it had 
been at the beginning of the 1980s, and well above the average for the other countries, with 
no tendency for the gap to narrow.  It can be concluded that in the mid-2000s Zambia 
remained one of the most heavily indebted countries in the sub-Saharan region. This 
indebtedness, combined with conditionality-related deficit limits, has resulted in a severe 
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fiscal constraint and therefore on the ability of the executive to supply patronage to powerful 
elites in the ruling coalition. 
 
Finally, central to understanding Zambia’s long-run trajectory of economic decline is why its 
main export, copper, suffered such a dramatic decline in both production and price terms.  
Many analysts have blamed an over interventionist state as the main cause (e.g. Thurlow and 
Worbst 2004). The reasons for the decline in Zambian economic performance are complex, 
but include a combination of the disruption of regional trading routes, the nationalisation of 
the copper industry before the development of skilled workers and managers emerged on the 
domestic scene, and mismanagement of the state-owned copper industry (see Weeks et al. 
2004).  Copper production declined from 600,000 tons in the 1960s to just over 300,000 tons 
by the end of the 1990s. 
 
The decline in copper had reversed a dramatic five-fold increase in copper production in the 
period 1939-1960 under the colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia. At this time, 
copper production was under the control of the British Mining Company. The declaration of 
independence by Rhodesia caused Zambia to lose its two transport links for exporting its 
copper, through Rhodesia and South Africa.  This resulted in a dramatic increase in transport 
costs, such that despite productivity raising innovations in copper mining and concentrating, 
Zambia was rendered a high-cost producer on the world market.  In 1976, construction was 
completed of a rail link to Dar es Salaam, but for ten years the Zambia economy suffered 
from the politically-motivated disruption of its export products.  The slow growth of the 
economy during 1965-1976 can to a great extent be explained by this disruption. Moreover, 
the rapid exodus of skilled white settler mining workers created a skilled shortage in labour. 
By necessity this replacement of labour occurred rapidly, before sufficient skills had been 
developed. As a result, Zambia was unable to take advantage of the years during which the 
price of copper increased.   
 
More recently there is evidence of renewed growth in Zambia.  Much of this has been driven 
by the growth in copper after three decades of decline (Figure A6). The new MMD 
goverenment elected in 1991 embarked on a radical shift in economic policy within the 
framework of multilateral stabilisation and adjustment programmes, a key element of which 
was the privatisation of the copper sector.  The government came under heavy influence from 
donors and lenders who were convinced that the state mining company represented a drain on 
public resources, and which could not be reformed within the public sector.   
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Figure A6:  Composition of Zambia’s Exports (US$ millions and %) 
Source: Calì and Te Welde 2007. 
 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the recent years of economic growth, the result of the long-run economic 
decline has had important impacts on poverty and unemployment. Poverty in rural areas 
affected 74 percent of the population and 52 percent were below the extreme poverty line.  
Thus, in 2003, more than half the rural population of Zambia was living at levels below the 
food-subsistence norm. Moreover, 52 percent of the urban population fell below the poverty 
line, compared to 45 to 46 percent during 1993-96. Poverty was exceptionally high among the 
rural small scale households.  Almost 5 million people classified as small scale farmers were 
poor, and over 3.5 million ‘extremely poor’ out of a total population of 11 million.   
 
In urban areas, the massive decline of formal sector jobs and incomes drove urban poverty 
trends in the 1980s and the 1990s.  Lowly paid and retrenched workers of state enterprises, as 
well as youth in urban areas, appear to have been the first victims of the adjustment era in 
recession-laden towns, particularly in the Copperbelt, and became new entrants in a saturated 
informal economy. Moreover, there have been significant increases in urban unemployment 
(Table A3). The extent to which there have been much larger increases in urban 
unemployment suggests that ‘urban bias’ in economic policy (see Bates and Collier 1993) 
may have changed substantially, if it ever really existed. Moreover, there is evidence that 
urban poverty worsened over the period 1991-2003 while rural poverty declined, which 
would also suggest the same thing. 
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Table A3: Unemployment rates, 1986-2003 (percent of labour force) 
Source: Weeks at al. 2004. 
 
Yea
r 
Zambia  Rural Urban 
1986 13 11 19
1991 22 14 34
1993 20 14 33
1996 15 9 29
1998 12 6 27
2003 16 5 36
 
 
Social indicators confirm the negative poverty trends during the 1990s. Zambia was one of 
the few countries in the world whose ranking on the Human Development Index declined in 
every year of the decade. Almost across the board, health, after improvements in the 1970s, 
nutrition and education worsened. Almost across the board, health, after improvements in the 
1970s, nutrition and education worsened.  The deterioration of the health of the Zambia 
population was also due to a crisis in public health services.  A dramatic decline in per capita 
health expenditure occurred between 1970 and 1992, which negatively affected existing 
infrastructure, quality of personnel and availability of basic drugs and equipment. The 
worsening of health conditions was associated with the spread of HIV/AIDS in the country, 
especially during the 1990s.  Reported prevalence rates from antenatal sentinel posts reached 
twenty percent of adults.38  
 
With a population of about 11 million in 2002, Zambia was one of the most urbanised 
countries in the sub-Saharan region.  Urbanisation approached its peak in the decade after 
independence, when mining and manufacturing sectors prompted rural-urban migration.  In 
1970, 40 percent of the population was urban and the country had numerous cities of over 
100,000 inhabitants. From the early 1990s this tendency reversed itself as mining declined 
and the rest of the urban economy followed it down.  As a result, urban population has 
decreased from 40 percent in 1980 to 35 percent in 2000.  This decline in urbanisation has not 
occurred almost anywhere since the middle of the twentieth century in the developed or 
underdeveloped world (Weeks et al. 2004; Potts 2005). What is clear from forty years of 
decline and instability is that neither strong public intervention and ownership, nor radically 
neo-liberal policy frameworks have achieved the economic diversification and equity required 
for sustainable growth in Zambia.  Pointing to the role that poor policies have played in 
Zambia’s economic decline would do more than delve deeply in to the surface of things.  
                                                 
38 Evidence suggests that by the mid-2000s one in every six adults was HIV positive, and eighty-nine thousand 
people died of AIDS in 2003. As a result, the most pessimistic estimate was that life expectancy at birth fell 
below forty, and over six hundred thousand children were AIDS orphans. 
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